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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) rights are entering a new, yet
largely under-studied era in which multinational companies
challenge domestic as well as international laws and regulations
that recognize, and in some cases are explicitly designed to
protect public health before a tribunal of three private
individuals without any required public health or human rights
expertise in what is known as investor-state arbitration.1 This
threatens to unsettle the regulatory discretion countries have to
safeguard public health and similar values embodied in the 1994
1. See generally JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES (2d ed. 2015) (discussing details of investor-state disputes).
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Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement2
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). TRIPS is notably the
first international agreement to mandate nations provide
“minimum” standards of IP protection;3 however, since it did not
impose uniform IP standards, countries retained some domestic
discretion to tailor intellectual property rights in accordance
with their policy preferences.4 That discretion is now threatened
by investor-state suits such as the ones initiated by Philip
Morris and Eli Lilly discussed in this article. Although these
suits challenge different state action, both inherently challenge
the ability of nations to balance IP rights against domestic
health interests. Philip Morris International challenges
domestic regulations to protect citizens from the known health
hazards of tobacco such as those limiting the use of trademarks
on packaging even though such action has international support
by entities such as the World Health Organization (WHO).5 Eli
Lilly, on the other hand, challenges domestic court decisions
finding its patents invalid under Canadian law that utilizes
TRIPS flexibilities that define the undefined minimum
standards of the TRIPS Agreement.
This article provides the first systematic examination of how
these disputes are intended to impact the WTO/TRIPS regime
through the principle of regime shifting, which focuses on
destabilizing existing understandings in one regime by actions
in a second regime.6 We argue that the goal of both the tobacco
2. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
3. Before TRIPS, international agreements only imposed obligations if a
nation granted them. See infra Section II.B.
4. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1, ¶ 1; Panel Report, China—Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶
7.513, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009) (“Article 1.1 clarifies that
the provisions of the Agreement are minimum standards only . . . . [and] grants
freedom to determine the appropriate method of implementation.”).
5. The reference to Philip Morris International includes any entity
associated or affiliated with this multinational tobacco company.
6. For example, the leading scholarly work in this area, Laurence R.
Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004),
examines regime shifting within the World Trade Organization, the World
Intellectual Property Organization, the Bio-Diversity Convention, and Plant
Genetics Resources regimes as well as the Public Health and Human Rights
regimes, but does not address the international investment regime. Granted,
although an international investment regime existed at this time, it was not
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and pharmaceutical industries in pursuing these investment
disputes is to destabilize existing explicit and implicit
understandings of the balance between the interests of
producers and consumers of IP rights embodied in international
as well as domestic laws in at least two senses: first, by seeking
to create conflicting interpretations of these laws and
regulations in investor-state arbitration, and second, by seeking
to rewrite these laws and regulations altogether. Thus, the
preference for bringing investor-state arbitration is not merely a
case of forum shopping which would entail pursuing a one-time
successful case—but regime shifting designed to re-draw
international and domestic laws and regulations that balance
intellectual property law protections with public purposes such
as safeguarding the regulatory autonomy7 of states in the areas
of health, human rights, and development.8 For example, as we
will explain, Eli Lilly’s investor-state case challenging Canada’s
invalidation of its patents aimed to not only change patentability
requirements in Canada, but potentially all WTO member
countries.9 In particular, Eli Lilly’s dispute challenged a widely
accepted TRIPS flexibility that some countries have recently
considered adopting and that the U.N. Secretary General’s High
Level Panel on Access to Medicine has just recommended
countries should embrace.10 In short, IP related cases filed in

embraced by companies to challenge intellectual property. Nonetheless, even
more recent regime shifting scholarship has not focused on this phenomenon.
Details of regime shifting are further discussed in Part I. But see Susan Strange,
Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, 36 INT’L ORG. 479 (1982)
(critiquing regime theory).
7. We use the phrase “regulatory autonomy” in this context to refer to both
traditional regulatory laws governing products, such as regulations requiring
tobacco plain packaging, as well as any laws that “regulate” intellectual
property norms, whether enacted by legislation or through judicial decisions.
8. See infra Section II.B.
9. See infra Section II.B.
10. Ruth Dreifuss & Festus Gontebanye Mogae (Co-chairs of the HighLevel Panel), Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel
on Access to Medicines: Promoting Innovation and Access to Health
Technologies, § 2.6.1 (Sept. 2016). Although this is a recent report that involved
substantial input, the U.N., as well as other policy makers have long
recommended that states embrace TRIPS flexibilities to promote better access
to lower cost drugs. E.g., Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur on the Right of
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and
Mental Health), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to
the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health, U.N. Doc. A/61/338, ¶ 47 (Sept. 13, 2006).
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investor-state dispute settlement are in our view designed to
destabilize the flexibilities countries have under the TRIPS
Agreement to promote public health. In addition, as later
discussed, these are part of a broader destabilization agenda.11
Some of these cases relate to a broader destabilization
agenda regarding public health. For example, there are thirtynine international cases surrounding tobacco in at least ten
different international courts and tribunals.12 By bringing these
cases, tobacco companies are not narrowly pursuing a strategy
of winning, but rather of creating uncertainty about the
boundaries of a broad variety of tobacco regulations.13 With
regard to challenges of plain packaging regulations, delays
arising from tobacco industry regulations mean that the
industry continues to earn revenues from tobacco sales as long
as those regulations are held in abeyance. Those profits may
very well far outweigh the cost of litigating these regulatory
controls.14 Although pharmaceutical industry litigation has not
been studied in the same systematic degree as tobacco litigation,
the pharmaceutical industry was one of the major architects
behind the creation of minimum standards of patent and other
IP protection as part of the WTO.15 In addition, just as the
tobacco industry challenges a variety of regulations including
but not limited to those that regulate IP, so too the

11. See infra Sections II.A, II.B, and II.C.
12. Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 383, 392–93 (2016). These cases have challenged “import and export taxes;
price, sale, export, and import controls; bans on tobacco products; marketing
and advertisement restrictions; labeling requirements; and brand registration
recognition.” Id. at 393. Notably, PMI, or an entity partially owned by or related
to it, is implicated in one about one-fourth of these cases. Id. at 393 n.51.
13. Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Firms’ Strategy Limits Poorer Nations’
Smoking Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13
/health/tobacco-industry-tactics-limit-poorer-nations-smoking-laws.html.
Tavernise argues, with extensive interviewing and information from the World
Health Organization and government officials from around the world, that
[t]obacco companies are pushing back against a worldwide rise in
antismoking laws, using a little-noticed legal strategy to delay or
block regulation. The industry is warning countries that their tobacco
laws violate an expanding web of trade and investment treaties,
raising the prospect of costly, prolonged legal battles . . . .
Id.
14. We thank Martin Bjorklund for pointing this possibility out to us.
15. See generally SUSAN K. SELL ET AL., PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 75–120 (Steve Smith et
al. eds., 2003).
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pharmaceutical industry vigorously challenges other domestic
regulatory actions, such as public health measures demanding
that companies reveal clinical data and price drugs at lower cost.
The investor suits are an important part of the destabilization
agenda. These suits promote destabilization and may also create
dissonance between the recommendations to use flexibilities to
promote public health made by the World Health Organization
and a variety of United Nations agencies, and the international
investment law regime’s promotion and protection of investor
rights.
Two important shifts have made international investment
law a new focus for the protection and enforcement of IP rights.
First, new generation investment agreements or investment
chapters nested in trade agreements, such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the TransPacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), explicitly make provision
for the protection of intellectual property rights as a covered
asset.16 Second, as we show with the examples of the investorstate suits brought by Eli Lilly and Phillip Morris, private
investors have invoked and pursued the dispute settlement
provisions of investor-state arbitration to challenge
international and domestic IP norms.17 These disputes threaten
to disrupt balances struck between protecting IP rights, on the
one hand, and values such as public health, as reflected in
TRIPS.18 Notably, it was difficult for member states to conclude
16. E.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 9.1, (Feb. 4, 2016),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf [hereinafter
TPP].
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. Of course, this is not the first time that domestic regulatory authority
has been threatened by investor-state suits. To protect the domestic right to
regulate in a variety of contexts, countries such as South Africa and Indonesia
have withdrawn or sought to limit the availability of investor-state dispute
settlement. E.g., Mohammad Mossallam, Process Matters: South Africa’s
Experience Exiting its BITs (Glob. Econ. Governance Programme Working
Paper No. 2015/97), http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files
/GEG%20WP_97%20Process%20matters%20-%20South%20Africas%
20experience%20exiting%20its%20BITs%20Mohammad%20Mossallam.pdf;
HOGAN LOVELLS, Indonesia Terminates Its Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
with the Netherlands from 1 July 2015 and May Terminate All of Its BITs,
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
2a596886-3ad2-464b-a510-ab3b0cff503b. Australia has also become more
skeptical of incorporating investor-state claims in agreements. E.g., Leon E.
Trakman & Kunal Sharma, Indonesia’s Termination of the NetherlandsIndonesia BIT: Broader Implications in the Asia-Pacific?, KLUWER
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TRIPS because many were reluctant to give up their previous
discretion to elect not to provide any intellectual property
protection at all. Although some reluctant states were successful
in including some balancing language in TRIPS, many scholars
and policy makers believe that the TRIPS Agreement already
compromises public health norms.19 Accordingly, a further shift
that destabilizes TRIPS norms could have a more substantial
impact for most countries considering that TRIPS is not the ideal
balance between protecting IP rights and values such as public
health.
Our story is not a linear one. Rather, it demonstrates how
multinational companies are consistently engaged in creating,
or threatening to create, alternative forums to challenge
international and domestic laws that might pose a threat to IP
rights without abandoning existing forums. Investor-state
litigation is the newest arena in which IP rights are contested,
but the significance of these disputes has largely been
overlooked.20 This article fills this gap. In addition, although this
article focuses on recent disputes, namely, the two Philip Morris
cases as well as the Eli Lilly case, the tobacco industry has for
decades contemplated using, and threatened to use, investorstate litigation against domestic tobacco packaging and other
public-regarding regulation to protect public health.21
Companies have continued to pursue their agenda for
strengthened IP rights concurrently in multiple forums with a
view to reshaping the internal dynamics and workings of the
ARBITRATION BLOG (Aug. 21, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/08
/21/indonesias-termination-of-the-netherlands-indonesia-bit-broaderimplications-in-the-asia-pacific/ (noting inclusion in agreement with Korea, but
not in agreement with Japan).
19. Since drug patents increase the cost of drugs, this is already seen as
inherently compromising the right to health. E.g., U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Soc. & Cultural
Rights, Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Statement by the Comm. on
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights on Its Twenty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2001/15, ¶ 12 (Dec. 14, 2001). Of course, some scholars have suggested
how nations can better promote public health within TRIPS constraints. See
infra Part III.
20. E.g., Henning Gross Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights
in Investor-State Arbitration: From Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation (Univ.
of Cambridge Faculty of L. Research Paper No. 2014-21, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463711
(viewing
investment claims as unlikely to succeed).
21. Infra Section II.A.
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domestic and international IP system.22 Although the desire for
strengthened protection of IP is not new, what is unique about
investor-state arbitration is that prevailing in such proceedings
could result in a regime shift that tilts the balance more towards
stronger IP rights and in the process weakens the regulatory
autonomy of states in favor of health, human rights, and
development.
This shift to investor-state arbitration is an important
change from previous rounds of regime shifting. Not only are
these investor-state dispute proceedings sending a regulatory
chill and legal uncertainty on efforts by States to regulate IP
industries, but if successful they would set in motion systemic
changes to the IP system decidedly in favor of rights holders in
the areas identified above. This new phenomenon comes at a
time when the strength of IP rights is undergoing scrutiny in
both the domestic and global arenas.23
We argue that this regime shifting to protect and enforce IP
rights in international investment law sheds new light in at
least three ways. First, unlike earlier scholarship on regime
shifting that primarily focused on lawmaking activity primarily
pursued by states, and to a lesser extent by inter-governmental
organizations and NGOs across a variety of regimes,24 this
22. This is particularly true regarding the scope of patent rights as the cost
of patented drugs increasingly strains domestic budgets. For example, the U.N.
convened a High Level Panel in November 2015 to address the problem of access
to medicine and create policy recommendations to better integrate human
rights laws and trade rules. E.g., UNITED NATIONS SEC’Y-GEN.’S HIGH-LEVEL
PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDS., THE PROCESS, http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org
/the-process/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). The final report provides
recommendations on how to better balance IP rights and public health,
including an embrace of TRIPS flexibilities. See Dreifuss & Mogae, supra note
10.
23. E.g., Dreifuss & Mogae, supra note 10; Council Conclusions on
Strengthening the Balance in the Pharmaceutical Systems in the European
Union and Its Member States, 2016 O.J. (C 269) 31. Although IP rights are not
new, increasing drug costs that strain domestic budgets are likely promoting
greater inquiry. E.g., Tahir Amen, The Downfall of Invention: A Broken Patent
System, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2016, 3:29 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-downfall-of-invention-a-broken-patent-system
_us_57b362a7e4b0edfa80d9c169; Jack Hoadley et al., The Cost of a Cure:
Revisiting Medicare Part D and Hepatitis C Drugs, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 3,
2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/11/03/the-cost-of-a-cure-revisitingmedicare-part-d-and-hepatitis-c-drugs/.
24. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 6, at 6 (“[T]he expansion of intellectual
property lawmaking into . . . diverse international fora is the result of a strategy
of ‘regime shifting’ by developing countries and NGOs that are dissatisfied with

2017]

REGIME SHIFTING OF IP

435

article sharply focuses on the strategic role of industry actors. In
a sense therefore, we are also influenced by the insights of
Transnational Legal Orders to the extent that we move beyond
a state-centric approach to more generally focus on lawmaking
and practice within a dynamic framework that simultaneously
examines “local, national, international, and transnational
public and private lawmaking and practice.”25 Capturing
lawmaking and practice within a single framework helps us to
highlight the considerable stakes between the variety of actors
involved because of their competing perspectives, values,
priorities, as well as because of distributive consequences that
arise.26 Hence, although industry actors have previously played
an important role in lobbying their home states to shift IP
regulation from domestic to international law, this article shows
how industry actors are for the first time pursuing international
disputes that do not depend on espousal of their claims by their
home state such as in the WTO dispute settlement system.
Second, this litigation strategy involves both lawmaking and a
shift of IP rights enforcement to investor-state arbitration where
remedies are broader than at the WTO—for example investorstate arbitration allows investors to seek retrospective relief,
unlike in the WTO. Such relief could include substantial
damages awards against States.27 Unlike litigation between
many provisions in TRIPS or its omission of other issues and are actively
seeking ways to recalibrate, revise, or supplement the treaty.”). Helfer does,
however, acknowledge that it is not only states but also non-state actors who
“attempt to reshape a regime’s constituent principles, norms, and rules by
shifting from one discrete regime to another or between fora within the same
conglomerate regime.” Id. at 9. For Helfer, states are a primary actor. For us,
the shift to international investment law is primarily driven by private actors.
In addition, we focus on the international investment law regime unlike Helfer
who focused on the biodiversity, plant genetic resources, public health, and
human rights regimes. But see Susan Sell, Cat and Mouse: Forum-Shifting in
the Battle Over Intellectual Property Enforcement 30 (Sept. 1, 2009) (draft)
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1466156) (focusing on both
norm setting and enforcement). Of course, before the regime shifting term was
coined, some had previously suggested that companies were successful in
shifting from WIPO to the WTO to create stronger and more effective
intellectual property enforcement. E.g., SELL ET AL., supra note 15.
25. Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds.,
2015).
26. Id. at 11.
27. The average award is over $16 million, but damages have been as large
as $50 billion. E.g., Susan D. Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to
Promote Conflict Management: An Introductory Guide, 29 INT’L CTR. FOR
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WTO members, investor-state arbitration gives corporations
that have substantial resources access to an adjudicatory system
against States that often can hardly match their resources. For
example, in 2013 Phillip Morris had $80.7 billion in annual
revenue while the Gross Domestic Product of Uruguay, against
which it brought an investor-state case, was $55.7 billion.28 It is
notable that Uruguay would have had to settle the case with
Philip Morris had billionaire philanthropist Michael Bloomberg
not volunteered to fund the costs of ICSID litigation.29 In
addition, unlike in the WTO where third party participation is
open to all WTO member States with an interest in the case,
investor-state arbitration traditionally has not allowed direct
third party participation. Although investment tribunals have
had the power to permit consideration of amicus briefs from
third parties, most agreements do not guarantee a right and
there are also limits on the scope of what can be considered.30
Third, unlike prior work on regime or forum shifting, this article
traces this latest shift of Intellectual Property Right (IPR)
protection and enforcement to international investment law
where IPR holders hope to prevail in re-writing or restricting
what they consider restrictive national and international laws
and regulations of their products. In effect, we argue that by
pursuing investor-state arbitration, investors hope to destabilize
widely held understandings of the TRIPS Agreement in a
manner that they may not otherwise be able to do in other
forums such as the WTO.31 Investor-state suits would in turn
SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. REV. 66, 79 (2014); Glyn Moody, Corporate Sovereignty
Tribunal Makes $50 Billion Award Against Russia, TECHDIRT (Aug. 5, 2014,
12:37 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140801/05242228082/corporate
-sovereignty-tribunal-makes-50-billion-award-against-russia.shtml.
28. See Leon Kaye, Philip Morris Sues Uruguay Over Anti-Smoking
Campaign, TRIPLE PUNDIT, (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015
/04/philip-morris-vs-uruguay-lawsuit-a-threat-to-smoking-restrictionsworldwide/.
29. See Tavernise, supra note 13 (noting that “Uruguay has acknowledged
that it would have had to drop its tobacco control law and settle with Philip
Morris International if the foundation of the departing mayor of New York,
Michael R. Bloomberg, had not paid to defend the law”); see also Press Release,
Bloomberg Philanthropies, Bloomberg Philanthropies & The Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation Launch Anti-Tobacco Trade Litigation Fund (Mar. 18, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.org/press/releases/bloomberg-philanthropies-billmelinda-gates-foundation-launch-anti-tobacco-trade-litigation-fund/.
30. See infra Subsection II.C.2.
31. Lawmaking between States in multilateral forums such as the WTO
often balances rights such as those of intellectual property protection with
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send a regulatory chill on the ability of WTO members to use
TRIPS flexibilities to, for example, make essential medicines
affordable.
This article illustrates this latest shift of protecting and
enforcing IP rights in the international investment law regime
using the examples of the recently concluded Eli Lilly and Phillip
Morris investor-arbitration cases. This shift has systemic
significance for at least three reasons.32 First, decisions arising
from investor challenges in arbitration proceedings launched by
investors will create new lawmaking and enforcement dynamics
that will invariably impact other forums where IP rights are
protected and enforced. Second, because each regime has its own
internal logic, there is no way to establish hierarchy between
them to avoid inevitable conflict, particularly given that private
investors are using investor-state arbitration to achieve
outcomes that are likely to be more favorable to them than in
other forums that are more open to concerns such as public
health and the participation of NGOs. Third, because investorstate dispute settlement is triggered by ‘automatic jurisdiction’
the inevitability of conflicting decisions with national judiciaries
and with the WTO regime that incorporates a carefully
interests such as public health. This is because in multilateral forums involving
both developed and developing countries, some States prioritize the interests of
IP producers, but others prioritize the interests of consumers. The outcomes of
such multilateral negotiations are therefore less likely to be slanted in any one
direction at the expense of the other. See, e.g., Eva Nanopoulos & Rumiana
Yotova, ‘Repackaging’ Plain Packaging in Europe: Strategic Litigation and
Public Interest Considerations, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 175 (2016). For example,
TRIPS reflects a compromise between the proposed strong IP protection
advocated by the United States versus much weaker IP protection advocated by
India. See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru,
Tanzania and Uruguay, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 (May 14, 1990);
Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the United States,
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990). Of course, when agreements
are between solely developed countries, such a balance does not exist. See
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., ch. 8, Sept. 14,
2016 [hereinafter CETA]; Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
[hereinafter TTIP], European Union’s Investment Chapter Proposal, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf.
32. Helfer, supra note 6, at 14–15 (describing systemic changes in a regime
as revolutionary to the extent that counter-regime norms pose “fundamental
challenges to underlying principles”).
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structured balance of rights and obligations between owners and
users of IP rights will likely be undermined.33 In fact, unlike
other scholars who have argued that regime complexity gives
developing countries the flexibility to craft IP regulation that
better suits their level of development and to balance between
importing and exporting IP-based goods and services,34 we argue
that the shift of IP lawmaking and enforcement to the
international investment regime is likely to run counter to the
interests of these countries. This is particularly so because the
balance between the rights of producers and consumers of IP
rights embodied in TRIPS flexibilities, while broadly accepted,
is a tenuous consensus at best as is reflected by the absence of
widespread adoption in practice among WTO members, as well
as the fact that some countries have been enacting free trade
agreements that erode some of these flexibilities. In this sense,
we see regime shifting as a politically and normatively contested
process in which powerful actors seek to free themselves from
domestic regulatory control and once they have achieved that
objective they shift from one international regime to another
international regime seeking the most hospitable one.35 To the
extent that regime shifting is a politically and normatively
contested process, we use it in that context rather than as a
neutral descriptor.

33. Of course the balancing we have in mind here is different from one WTO
agreement to another.
34. See, e.g., Sell, supra note 24, at 30; Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting
in the International Intellectual Property System, 7 PERS. ON POL. 39 (2009)
[hereinafter Helfer 2009]; Helfer, supra note 6, at 13; Amy Kapczynski,
Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in
India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009); Jerome H.
Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115 (2009); Gregory
C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements,
and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010).
35. In this sense, we agree with Martti Koskenniemi when he argues that
[i]n normal situations of international life the actors disagree on such
matters, putting forward competing understandings and rival
interpretations of the relevant rules or policies. These are situations
that I like to call hegemonic contestation so as to highlight that what
is at stake is not only what the general view is but who is entitled to
determine it.
Martti Koskenniemi, Hegemonic Regimes, in REGIME INTERACTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 305, 312 (Margaret A. Young
ed., 2012) (emphasis omitted); see also Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and
Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in
an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209 (2002).
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This article proceeds as follows. After this Introduction, Part
I delves into regime shifting theory and how the regime shift we
track in this paper is intended to destabilize existing
understandings of IP laws and regulations by creating counternorms or seeking to rewrite them altogether. Part II discusses
examples of the regime shift focusing in particular on Philip
Morris’ challenges to tobacco regulations in Australia and
Uruguay as well as Eli Lilly’s challenge of a Canadian Supreme
Court decision that invalidated its patents. This Part also
demonstrates how this shift threatens to effectively water-down
TRIPS flexibilities in a manner that currently seems to preclude
countervailing shifts that would better preserve public health
goals. In Part III, we offer some tentative suggestions to counter
the consequences of a shift to enforcement of IP rights in
investor-state arbitration. Our suggestions are in two categories.
The first relates to reforms for future investment treaties
particularly in defining with precision key terms and rights such
as ensuring States reserve their right to regulate as well as what
treaty definitions of terms such as fair and equitable treatment
(FET) and indirect expropriation mean. Second, this Part also
suggests modifications to the procedures that govern investorstate disputes for both parties to the dispute, as well as the
arbitrators.
I. REGIME SHIFTING
A. DEFINING REGIME SHIFTING
Before discussing the recent regime shift to the investment
arena, it is important to briefly explain what we mean by a
“regime,” as well as “regime shifting.” In using these terms, we
are building on the work of international legal and political
science scholars who use these terms to account and explain the
increasing density of rules of international law governing
discrete subject matter as well as the manner in which these
disparate regimes overlap and create conflicts or convergences.
We follow Laurence Helfer’s definition of a regime as
comprising
substantive,
institutional
and
relational
components.36 A regime can focus on a single international

36. Helfer, supra note 6, at 10. Of course, although Helfer was the first to
discuss regime shifting regarding international intellectual property, he builds
on the work of scholars who have studied international regimes. E.g.,
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agreement or intergovernmental organization, but more broadly
encompass broader interests, such as whether non-state actors
can participate, even if not legally bound by the agreement.37
Each regime comes with its unique “institutional features,
subject
matter
competencies,
and
decision-making
procedures.”38 Substantively, a regime has principles, norms,
and rules that prescribe state behavior.39 Institutionally, a
regime comprises of the “cooperative arrangements states use to
create principles, norms, and rules.”40 The relational aspect of a
regime “focuses on the substantive issue areas that are included
within a particular regime and the ways in which they intersect
with the issue areas of other regimes.”41 The proliferation of
regimes in a variety of issue areas in international law,
sometimes with overlapping, conflicting, or converging
mandates has been referred to as fragmentation.42 The absence
of a hierarchy or conflict rules between regimes that cover the
same subject matter and actors that would effortlessly resolve
cases of parallel jurisdiction opens up fragmentation to States
and non-state actors to explore options and opportunities
between these regimes by exiting one regime and entering
another with a view to establishing which regime best advances
their interests.43
Regime shifting focuses on improving power dynamics by
shifting from one regime with a view to directly or indirectly
create alternative law or practices that conflict with those in

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983); Robert Keohane, The
Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT’L REGIMES 325 (1982).
37. Helfer, supra note 6, at 10.
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 12.
42. An authoritative assessment of this is contained in Martti
Koskenniemi, Int’l Law Comm., Rep. of the Study Grp. of the Int’l Law Comm’n
on Its Fifty-Eight Session, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682, ¶ 34 (Apr. 13, 2006).
43. E.g., Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant
Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277 (2004) (noting the non-hierarchical nature
of regime complexes). Regime complexes spawned by fragmentation in turn
enable actors to engage in regime shifting. E.g., Karen J. Alter & Sophie
Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 13,
20 (2009) (noting that “international regime complexity facilitates exit via noncompliance, regime shifting, or withdrawal from [international organizations]”).
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another regime.44 Although a regime shift involves shifting to a
new forum, it is distinct from forum shifting because a forum
shift is a one-time shift to a new forum for a single dispute. The
goal of a regime shift, on the other hand, is a “longer-term
strategy that seeks to create outcomes that have feedback effects
in other venues.”45 Actors engaged in regime-shifting believe
that “such shifts will enhance their relative power or their
prospects for achieving desired policy outcomes in ways that
could not have been obtained in the absence of such moves.”46 In
particular, actors change rulemaking venues to forums “whose
mandates and priorities favor their concerns and interests.”47 In
so doing, actors seeking a new regime seek changes in the
institutional status quo that is inconsistent with their
interests.48 Regime shifting can also be used to relieve pressure
from “domestic interest groups for lawmaking in other regimes”
as well as developing rules that could be integrated into a
dominant regime like the World Trade Organization.49 Regime
shifting is therefore a continual process of “contestation within
and across forums” where rights are made and enforced.50 One
of the most important consequences of regime shifting is a
conflict of principles, rules, and norms between regimes.51 In the
44. See generally Julia C. Morse & Robert O. Keohane, Contested
Multilateralism, 9 REV. INT’L ORG. 393 (2014) (discussing this phenomenon;
defining it as ‘contested multilateralism’).
45. Helfer 2009, supra note 34, at 39; see also Helfer, supra note 6, at 14
(defining regime shifting as “an attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving
treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from
one international venue to another”).
46. Helfer, supra note 6, at 7; Amandine Orsini, Multi-Forum Non-State
Actors: Navigating the Regime Complexes for Forestry and Genetic Resources,
13 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 34, 41 (2013) (arguing that through forum shifting a
debate is moved from one forum to another “that better reflects an actor’s
interest”).
47. Helfer 2009, supra note 34, at 39. Susan Sell also argues that the goal
of forum shifting as she calls it is to “optimize . . . power and advantages and
minimize opposition.” Sell, supra note 24, at 5; see also Alter & Meunier, supra
note 43, at 21 (“[W]here actor preferences diverge and a threshold of
international regime complexity occurs, explanations involving the behavior of
actors or the outcomes of cooperation politics will be more ‘fuzzy’—there will be
multiple paths to an outcome, involving linked sets of behaviors and events.”).
48. Morse & Keohane, supra note 44; see also Peter K. Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 323 (2004) (exploring a variety of regime shifts in the IP area).
49. Helfer, supra note 6, at 82.
50. Sell, supra note 24, at 8.
51. See Helfer, supra note 6, at 72.
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context of IPR, Helfer argues that regime shifting, “destabilizes
existing approaches to intellectual property protection and
generates new dynamics of lawmaking, standard setting, and
dispute settlement.”52 Julia Morse and Robert Keohane, argue
that regime shifting occurs “when challengers to a set of rules
and practices shift to an alternative multilateral forum with a
more favorable mandate and decision rules, and then use this
new forum to challenge standards in the original institution or
reduce the authority of that institution.”53
Regime shifting occurs in the context of a regime complex.
A regime complex is made up of separate related regimes.54 For
example, intellectual property rights are addressed in a number
of regimes, including: (i) the WTO; (ii) the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO); (iii) a variety of United Nations
agencies; and (iv) the World Health Organization. In short,
today there is an IP regime complex that involves multiple
interdependent and porous regimes55 that can result in interregime conflicts. As a result—and as we shall explain further
below—when states adopt rules such as the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, they create new tensions and
conflicts with the strengthened protection of IP rights that are
contained in TRIPS as well as in investment agreements. This
is because treaties like the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control contain obligations that authorize signatory States to
pursue measures such as plain packaging, which in turn lays the
basis for investors to pursue claims to prevent States from
interfering with the enjoyment of their IP rights.56 In addition,
different regimes have different rules that define the extent to
which nongovernmental entities, including NGOs such as
Medicines Sans Frontiers, as well as public private partnerships

52. Id. See generally Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of
International Regimes, 41 INT’L ORG. 491, 496 (1987) (describing general
theories of international regimes and how variation and change in regimes
impacts the political landscape).
53. Morse & Keohane, supra note 44, at 392 (quoting Helfer 2009, supra
note 34, at 39) (noting that they borrow from Helfer who “suggests that regime
shifting works by ‘broadening the policy spaces within which decisions are made
and rules are adopted’”).
54. Alter & Meunier, supra note 43, at 13 (noting that regime complexity
entails “nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that
are not hierarchically ordered”).
55. Helfer, supra note 6, at 16.
56. See, e.g., Ruse-Khan, supra note 20, at 2–11.
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such as the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, can participate.57 Whereas regimes such as the WTO
and U.N. permit broad participation of NGOs, that is not true of
investor-state arbitration.58 These differing regimes reflect an
unstructured plurality of independent decentralized actors
regarding the issue of global health. As a result, investor-state
arbitration could potentially destabilize balances struck
between intellectual property rights and health rights struck in
the WTO or the WHO.59
In short, a shift from the WTO to investor-state arbitration
involves a move to change policy and rules agreed upon in one
regime, to another regime. Although our focus in this article is
on regime shifting, which until the most recent shift has not
involved private actors, we recognize that there is the related
area of Transnational Legal Ordering that more typically
focuses not only on State entities but also on individual private
actors that aim to order behavior across domestic and global
dimensions. Indeed, Helfer, a leading scholar of IP regime
shifting, has described some of the same global activities as an
evolving transnational legal order on access to medicine.60
However, our aim here is to focus on the significant yet
understudied shift from the WTO and other trade agreements to
investment disputes as a means of destabilizing existing
understandings to shape IP law, policy, and enforcement. While
this is consistent with transnational legal ordering, we will
primarily focus on regime shifting, including the key differences
regarding institutional and enforcement mechanisms of each
regime that highlight the dangers of this shift. Before our
detailed description of the IP regime shift to the international

57. See JOSHUA LEON, THE RISE OF GLOBAL HEALTH: THE EVOLUTION OF
EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION 126–32 (2015).
58. See, e.g., Ruse-Khan, supra note 20.
59. David P. Fidler, Architecture Amidst Anarchy: Global Health’s Quest for
Governance, 1 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 3 (2007) (referring to the plurality
of actors involved in global governance as constituting an “unstructured
plurality”).
60. Laurence R. Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to
Health: The Contested Evolution of the Transnational Legal Order on Access to
Medicines, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 25, at 311; see also
Gregory Shaffer & Susan Sell, Transnational Legal Ordering and Access to
Medicines, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo
A. Bagley eds., 2014).
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investment arena, we will briefly explain IP regime shifting
prior to this latest shift.
B. IP REGIME SHIFTING
Regime shifting involving IP in the international arena is
not a new phenomenon.61 The WTO/TRIPS framework shifted IP
rulemaking not only from domestic to international law, but also
from prior agreements solely concerning intellectual property to
the trade regime.62 Multinational companies successfully
lobbied the United States and Japanese governments, as well as
multiple European governments.63 Prior international
agreements only governed IP rights if a nation decided to
provide such rights.64 In addition, although the Paris
Convention for Patents modestly governed enforcement of
patents, when countries were unsuccessful in strengthening
rights under this agreement, they turned to the WTO.65 The
TRIPS Agreement provided the first-ever requirements for
countries to enact domestic IP rights, backed up by an
enforceable system of dispute settlement.66
Another regime shift seeking to tilt the IP regime in favor of
the interests of developing countries occurred when these
countries, supported by non-governmental organizations,
succeeded in creating counter-norms to IP protection for access
to essential medicines in forums such as the World Health
Organization and the United Nations Human Rights system.67

61. E.g., Yu, supra note 48.
62. Moreover, this is arguably not the first regime shift impacting
international IP. E.g., id.
63. E.g., PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:
WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 10 (2002); SELL ET AL., supra note 15,
at 96–108.
64. For example, a nation that provided patents could not treat patent
applications of its own nationals more favorably than those of foreign
applicants. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, arts. 2–
3, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583; see also Patent Cooperation Treaty, art. 1(1), June 19,
1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645 (creating a mechanism to easily file patent applications in
multiple countries without dictating substantive law for granting of patents).
65. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 6, at 20–21.
66. See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 41–49.
67. E.g., Alter & Meunier, supra note 43, at 20; Eyal Benvenisti & George
W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation
of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 597 (2007); Helfer 2009, supra note
34, at 41; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 34; Heiko Baumgärtner, Patents, Power,

2017]

REGIME SHIFTING OF IP

445

Notably, these regimes allow more access and participation for
NGOs than the WTO. Thus, developing states could combine
forces with NGOs to strengthen counter-norms globally. These
counter-norms were also introduced into the WTO/TRIPS
regime, particularly through the 2001 Doha Ministerial
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health that recognized that
patent provisions of the TRIPS Agreement should not be
construed as a barrier to accessing affordable medicines.68
Concurrently with the regime shift for counter-norms
regarding public health, there has been a shift towards higher
standards of IP protection through other free trade
agreements.69 Initially free trade agreements with enhanced
intellectual property protection were bilateral agreements,
predominantly initiated by countries like the United States and
entities like EU. They were designed to obtain stronger IP
rights—and also curtail some TRIPS flexibilities—than could be
negotiated in the WTO forum.70 By singling out a subset of WTO
countries, developed countries “use their market power to
leverage negotiations to their advantage over much weaker
economies” that are often still enticed by the carrot of broader
trade with the United States.71 In addition, developed countries
aimed to increase intellectual property standards by creating
uniform patent standards that could not be obtained in TRIPS

and Rhetoric: Intellectual Property Rights and the Politics of Regime
Complexity, (Universität Luzern, “Glocal Governance and Democracy” Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 4, 2011), https://www.unilu.ch/fileadmin/fakultaeten
/ksf/institute/polsem/Dok/Patents-Power-Rhetoric-wp04.pdf.
68. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶¶ 4–5 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Public
Health Declaration].
69. Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting,
FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011).
70. E.g., id.; see also SELL ET AL., supra note 15 (noting a comment by a U.S.
advocate that “we got 95% of what we wanted” in TRIPS). Of course, these
agreements were used in conjunction with a variety of other mechanisms,
including diplomatic and legal threats and industry pressure. E.g., CAROLYN
DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 154–64 (2009).
71. James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade
Agreements, 86 WASH. L. REV. 421, 446 (2011). In addition, pursuing developing
countries in a piecemeal fashion can also set the stage for higher multilateral
IP requirements. E.g., Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual
Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001).
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with a proposed patent law treaty.72 Although developing
countries were successful in defeating this, they have not
forestalled the regime shift towards higher levels of protection
through regional and mega-regional trade agreements.73
Recently proposed agreements include the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), the Transpacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP). Sometimes these agreements are solely
between developed countries, which can then set the stage for
imposing equivalent levels of protection for developing countries.
Although ultimately unsuccessful, ACTA was one such
example.74 More recent examples whose ultimate success
remains to be seen are the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and EU and the
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA).

72. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2,
Second Expert Report of Daniel J. Gervais, 10–18 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb.
Trib. Dec. 7, 2015); Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/draft_splt.htm; Jerome H. Reichman &
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical
Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85
(2007).
73. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Assemblies of the Member States
of WIPO, Forty-Third Series of Meetings: General Report, A/43/16 (Nov. 12,
2007); see also World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], WIPO General Assembly,
Thirty-First (15th Extraordinary) Session: Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for
the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (August
27, 2004) (initial proposal).
74. At the time it was negotiated, this was considered the highest standard
of IP rights, yet only open to eight developed countries as a “club” agreement.
E.g., Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 555 (2009)
(“The approach is neither regional nor truly multilateral; it is a ‘club
approach.’”). Nonetheless, it was contemplated that ACTA would influence nonsignatory developing countries. E.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT
(ACTA) (2008) (noting that the USTR looked forward to providing “technical
assistance” to developing countries and partnering with them); Sell, supra note
69, at 456 (anticipating that ACTA provisions would appear in subsequent
agreements that included developing countries).
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II. THE IP REGIME SHIFT TO THE INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
A. EVIDENCE OF AN IP REGIME SHIFT TO ISDS AND REGULATORY
CHILL
The Philip Morris challenges to tobacco laws, as well as Eli
Lilly’s challenge to Canada’s patent laws, are evidence of a
regime shift in enforcement of IP claims to investor-state
arbitration.75 In our view, this shift is a strategy by IP companies
to destabilize the balances struck in IP regimes such as the WTO
with a view to creating counter-norms or re-writing domestic
and international laws and regulations that the industry
considers to be inconsistent with their IP rights. This section
traces this shift and its destabilization agenda.
Although plans to use investor-state dispute settlement by
companies in earlier decades is likely shrouded by attorneyclient privilege, there is some evidence we have uncovered to
demonstrate this has been on the drawing boards since at least
1990.76 In this section, we outline these plans and explain why
investor-state dispute settlement is particularly favorable for
companies as an avenue to challenge international or domestic
regulations they argue are inconsistent with their IP rights.
The parties to the TRIPS Agreement discussed more
extensive investment provisions for the forthcoming WTO, but
could only agree on trade-related investment measures.77 In
1988, the United States was contemplating a comprehensive
agreement on investment under the auspices of the
75. Although we recognize that some might consider the Philip Morris
investment cases to be an example of parallel proceedings or forum proliferation
since there is simultaneously a WTO case, we also consider this an example of
regime shifting under our definition that the goal in pursuing the investment
cases is to change WTO law; that might include—but is certainly not limited
to—the pending WTO case regarding similar facts.
76. EUR. ROUND TABLE OF INDUSTRIALISTS, EUROPEAN INDUSTRY: A
PARTNER OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AS A TOOL
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION—SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
IMPROVEMENTS 35 (1993); Belen Balanya et al., MAIGALOMANIA!: Citizens
and the Environment Sacrificed to Corporate Investment Agenda: A Briefing by
Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) (1998), http://archive.corporateeurope.org
/mai/MAIGALOMANIA.txt.
77. See, e.g., William J. Drake & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Ideas, Interests, and
Institutionalization: “Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round, 46 INT’L ORG.
37 (1992) (stating that investment as well as IP provisions were lobbied for
inclusion into the WTO).
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).78 This was a more favorable venue for negotiating a
full-scale investment agreement than the WTO because its
members are all developed countries. In 1995, the OECD Council
of Ministers approved a negotiating mandate for a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) that would have strengthened
and multilateralized existing bilateral investment treaties as
well as regional agreements with investment provisions such as
NAFTA.79 Although developing countries were not privy to these
negotiations, the draft signaled that the MAI was open to
accession by non-members who had not been involved in the
negotiations.80 A leaked draft of the Agreement in 1997 led to a
successful campaign to derail it by non-governmental
organizations who were outraged by its pro-investor content, as
well as inadequate public debate on it.81
Even as the MAI failed in the mid-1990s, companies were
keenly watching and challenging the emergence of laws and
regulations they regarded as adversely impacting their IP
rights.82 Although most countries have been reluctant to use
their TRIPS patent flexibilities, companies have targeted those
who attempt to do so, with the goal of discouraging other
countries from doing so.83 For example, when South Africa

78. See EUR. ROUND TABLE OF INDUSTRIALISTS, supra note 76, at 35;
Balanya et al., supra note 76.
79. Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI), The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text,
OECD, chs. 2–3, Apr. 22, 1998, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, [hereinafter MAI
Negotiations Text] http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf; Jürgen
Kurtz, NGOs, the Internet and International Economic Policy Making: The
Failure of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 3 MELB. J. INT’L L.
213, 221 (2002).
80. See Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI), Accession by Non-Member Countries (Note by the Chairman), OECD,
Apr. 4, 1996, DAFFE/MAI(96)13, http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9613e
.pdf; Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI),
Participation of Non-Members (Note by the Chairman), OECD, May 9, 1997,
DAFFE/MAI(97)21, http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9721e.pdf; MAI
Negotiations Text, supra note 79, ch. 3.
81. E.g., Kurtz, supra note 79; see also KATIA TIELEMAN, UN VISION
PROJECT ON GLOB. PUB. POL’Y NETWORKS, THE FAILURE OF THE MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAI) AND THE ABSENCE OF A GLOBAL PUBLIC
POLICY NETWORK (2008), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.627.7992&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
82. See, e.g., Dreifuss & Mogae, supra note 10.
83. Id.
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amended its patent act in 1997 to permit parallel imports of
generic drugs, thirty-seven multinational pharmaceutical
companies promptly filed suit to challenge that law.84 Although
the companies eventually capitulated in the face of public
opposition, they have continued to monitor and oppose domestic
legislation in South Africa such as the “Pharmagate” scandal
which involved an extensive plot to defeat South African patent
reforms.85 Similarly, tobacco companies have fiercely opposed
domestic legislation on packaging that have impacted their
trademarks in Canada, the United States,86 Australia, New
Zealand,87 the UK, and elsewhere.88
The tobacco companies’ actions may serve as a template for
how companies seek to use investor-state disputes, or the threat
of such disputes, to obtain desired levels of IP rights. For
example, tobacco companies fought tobacco regulation not only
in developed countries such as Canada and Australia, but also
in poor countries such as Kenya,89 Namibia, Gabon, Togo, and
84. Notice of Motion, Pharm. Mfrs.’ Ass’n of S. Afr. v. President of the
Republic of S. Afr. 1998 (2) SA 674 (High Court) (S. Afr.); see also WILLIAM W.
FISHER III & CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA AIDS CONTROVERSY: A
CASE STUDY IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3 (2005), https://cyber.harvard.edu
/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf.
85. E.g., Philip De Wet, Motsoaledi: Big Pharma’s ‘Satanic’ Plot is
Genocide, MAIL & GUARDIAN: NAT’L (Jan. 17, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://mg.co.za
/article/2014-01-16-motsoaledi-big-pharmas-satanic-plot-is-genocide/;
Lotti
Rutter, Leaked PharmaGate Emails Prove Big Pharma Involvement in Scandal,
TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN (Jan. 21, 2014, 12:40 AM), http://www
.tac.org.za/news/leaked-pharmagate-emails-prove-big-pharma-involvementscandal.
86. When the United States considered prohibiting tobacco advertising, the
industry fiercely—and successfully—opposed this. See Tobacco Control and
Marketing: Hearings on H.R. 5041 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 101st Cong. (1990).
87. The tobacco industry was able to successfully lobby to defeat New
Zealand’s early legislation with the help of New Zealand athletes. See, e.g.,
GEORGE THOMSON & NICHOLAS WILSON, AUSTRALASIAN FACULTY OF PUB.
HEALTH MED., RESOURCE DOCUMENT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF TOBACCO CONTROL
IN NEW ZEALAND 41–42 (1997).
88. E.g., British American Tobacco U.K. Ltd. v. Sec’y of State for Health
[2016] EWHC (Admin) 1169 (Eng.); see also Peter Evans, Philip Morris, British
American Tobacco Challenges U.K. Cigarette-Packaging Order, WALL ST. J.
(May 22, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/philip-morris-challenges
-u-k-cigarette-packaging-order-1432292719.
89. See MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH & SANITATION & INT’L INST. FOR
LEGISLATIVE STUD., TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE IN KENYA: EXPOSING
THE TACTICS (2013), http://tobaccotactics.org/images/8/86/Ti_interference_in
_Kenya.pdf; Rachel Rose Jackson, Tobacco Industry Accused of ‘Intimidation
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Uganda that have little or no expertise in international
investment law and that cannot match the resources of these
companies to effectively fight off their investor-state
challenges.90 Notably, for countries that did not back down from
tobacco regulations, the industry initiated domestic litigation,
followed in some cases by an investor-state proceeding, as well
as finding States to espouse a challenge in the WTO on their
behalf.91 These challenges at the national level have had a
significant chilling effect on the ability of governments to
regulate tobacco products—at least before the conclusion of the
Australia and Uruguay investment cases.92 In addition, despite
the relatively positive conclusion of the tobacco investment
cases, these disputes, as well as Eli Lilly’s dispute against
Canada, may have a chilling effect on the extent to which
and Interference’ in Kenya, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2015, 9:17 AM), http://www
.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/mar/02/tobacco-industry-accusedintimidation-interference-kenya; John Muchangi, Why MPs Should Pass
Tobacco Regulations, THE STAR (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://allafrica.com
/stories/201503300716.html (detailing the efforts of British American Tobacco
to derail efforts to have the government pass regulations to bring into force the
Tobacco Control Act, which implements obligations under the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control).
90. E.g., Tavernise, supra note 13. Namibia’s Health Minister is reported
to have said, “we have bundles and bundles of letters from them,” so that
“[t]hree years later, the government, fearful of a punishingly expensive legal
battle, has yet to carry out a single major provision of the law, like limiting
advertising or placing large health warnings on cigarette packaging.” Id. In fact,
efforts to challenge tobacco control efforts in developing countries date back to
the 1980s. E.g., J. Knight & S. Chapman, “Asia is Now the Priority Target for
the World Anti-Tobacco Movement”: Attempts by the Tobacco Industry to
Undermine the Asian Anti-Smoking Movement, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL ii30, ii31
(2004) (noting that between the 1980s and 1990s “the industry built up a
comprehensive dossier on its opponents including those in the Asian region”).
91. See infra Annex One; see also Peter K. Yu, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE JUDICIARY 7 (Christophe Geiger ed., Edward Elgar Publ’g, forthcoming
2017) [hereinafter Yu, ISDS], http://www.peteryu.com/isds.pdf (noting the
potential of ISDS destabilizing the TRIPS Agreement regime); Sergio Puig, The
Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
1 (2015) [hereinafter Puig, Merging] (arguing that litigants go forum shopping
between the international trade and investment regimes with a view “to
destabilize governments’ regulatory activity, to shape the interpretation of rules
outside an ordinary process, or to re-litigate issues settled in one regime
through the venue of another”).
92. Yu, ISDS, supra note 91; Puig, Merging supra note 91, at 1; see also,
e.g., Tavernise, supra note 13 (noting that even developed countries like New
Zealand have hesitated to enact planned tobacco regulations in light of fears of
investment claims).
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developing countries are willing to embrace the recommended
adoption of TRIPS flexibilities for patent protection.
Our research shows that May 1994 is the first time a
company disclosed its intention to bring an investor-state suit to
protect IP governed by TRIPS.93 At this time, Canada was
preparing plain package legislation,94 although Canada had
contemplated generic packaging of tobacco as early as 1986.95
Philip Morris wrote to the Canadian congressional committee
contemplating plain packaging and asserted that those laws
would constitute an expropriation of their trademarks.96 To
support this argument, Philip Morris included two opinions, one
of which was made by former U.S. Trade Representative Carla
Hills, who argued that the proposed legislation would lead to
“massive [investor] compensation claims” that “would be
staggering, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars,”97 and
another from former U.S. Deputy Trade Representative Julius
Katz. Similarly, the CEO of RJR MacDonald sent a letter to the
Prime Minister of Canada arguing that the law would violate the
investment chapter of NAFTA.98 The committee concluded that
plain packaging could be a “reasonable component” of tobacco
control and recommended that legislation be developed pending
outcome of research on effectiveness of such packaging.99
However, the tobacco industry discredited the health minister,
consistent with its lobbying goals. Thereafter, the new health
minister, who was more sympathetic to trademark claims, did
not pursue plain packaging.100

93. ROGER SIMMONS, HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMM. ON HEALTH,
REPORT, TOWARDS ZERO CONSUMPTION: GENERIC PACKAGING OF TOBACCO
PRODUCTS STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT 21 (1994).
94. Id.
95. E.g., PHYSICIANS FOR SMOKE-FREE CANADA, THE PLOT AGAINST PLAIN
PACKAGING: HOW MULTINATIONAL TOBACCO COMPANIES COLLUDED TO USE
TRADE ARGUMENTS THEY KNEW WERE PHONEY TO OPPOSE PLAIN PACKAGING
AND HOW HEALTH MINISTERS IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA FELL FOR THEIR
CHICANERY 16–19 (2008).
96. Letter from R.J. Reynolds to Standing Committee on Health (May 4,
1994).
97. Memorandum from Carla A. Hills to R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris
18, 21 (May 3, 1994).
98. Letter to Jean Chrétien, Prime Minster of Canada 5 (Mar. 25, 1994)
(warning of “possible violations . . . of NAFTA and GATT which protect
trademarks and investments”).
99. SIMMONS, supra note 93, at 28.
100. PHYSICIANS FOR SMOKE-FREE CANADA, supra note 95, at 29–39.
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The next time the tobacco industry considered an investorstate suit was in 2001. At that time, Philip Morris argued that
the proposed bans on the use of “light” and “mild” on tobacco
products would, if enacted, constitute an expropriation of
trademarks.101 Unlike the prior situation where an investment
dispute was merely threatened, Philip Morris took action. In
particular, Philip Morris filed a notice of intent to submit a claim
to arbitration, under NAFTA, asserting that this constituted
expropriation.102 Canada did not impose the regulations; rather,
in a settlement, the companies agreed to willingly remove these
labels.103
More recently, the tobacco industry has brought investment
cases against Uruguay and Australia after attempts to combat
regulation of packaging at the domestic level failed. Notably, the
contested national laws were adopted after the conclusion of the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in 2003.104
The Framework Convention does not expressly require countries
to bar use of trademarks, but its guidelines for implementation
do suggest limiting trademarks.105 After unsuccessfully
challenging Uruguay’s two laws regulating trademarks on
tobacco products in Uruguay’s courts,106 Philip Morris initiated
101. Philip Morris International Inc., Submission by Philip Morris
International Inc. in Response to the National Center for Standards and
Certification Information, No. G/TBT/N/CAN (Feb. 20, 2002), at 6–8,
http://www.essentialaction.org/tobacco/pmresponsetonoi.pdf (arguing that the
ban would be “tantamount to an expropriation of tobacco trademarks” as well
as “unfair and inequitable” and in violation of NAFTA).
102. Although the actual notice of intent to submit a claim to arbitration was
not made publicly available, there is nonetheless evidence that the case was
filed. E.g., Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products Dispute, http://www.italaw.com
/cases/1282. NAFTA provides for a Notice of Intent as notification of filing of an
arbitration. Other systems such as the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) refer to it as a Notice of Arbitration.
103. Maureen McGrath, Competition Bureau Reaches Agreement with the
Three Major Cigarette Manufacturers to Stop Using “Light” and “Mild” on
Cigarette Packages, MARKETWIRED (Nov. 9, 2006, 11:13 AM), http://www
.marketwired.com/press-release/competition-bureau-reaches-agreement-withthree-major-cigarette-manufacturers-stop-using-620985.htm.
104. WHO, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2003).
105. WHO, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Guidelines for
Implementation of Article 11 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, ¶ 46, FCTC/COP3(10) (Nov. 2008), http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/
adopted/article_11/en/.
106. The “single presentation requirement” precluded more than one variant
of cigarette per brand family to avoid consumers thinking that some were
healthier, while the “80/80” regulation increased the size of health warnings
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an investor-state dispute against Uruguay in 2010.107 Given the
potential for extremely high damages that Philip Morris could
have won in this case, a number of commentators suggested that
the investment claim was intended to caution other countries
considering similar laws that they may also be subjected to an
investor-state suit.108 Similarly, after failing in its domestic
efforts to halt the first plain package law adopted by Australia,
Philip Morris initiated an investment dispute in 2012.109
The Philip Morris investment cases are important not only
for their use of investor-state disputes, but for what types of
claims were brought against Australia and Uruguay. Both cases
argued that trademarks were “expropriated,” based in large part
on a claim that there was an affirmative right to use registered
trademarks allegedly supported by the Paris Convention and
TRIPS,110 even though intellectual property experts have argued
otherwise.111 In an expropriation claim, an investor alleges that
some conduct by a government has devalued their investment in
a manner similar to, but broader than, a domestic taking of

from 50% of the package to 80%. Ministerio de Salud Pública [Ministry of Public
Health], Decreto No. 287/009, art. 1 (June 15, 2009) (Uru.); Ministerio de Salud
Pública [Ministry of Public Health], Ordenanza Ministerial 466/009, art. 1
(Sept. 1, 2009) (Uru.).
107. FTR Holding S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010).
108. E.g., Duff Wilson, Cigarette Giants in Global Fight on Tighter Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/business
/global/14smoke.html; Tobacco Control in Uruguay after the Industry Lawsuit,
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ALLIANCE,
http://www.fctc.org/media-andpublications/media-releases-blog-list-view-of-all-313/industry-interference
/1341-tobacco-control-in-uruguay-after-the-industry-lawsuit (last visited Feb.
26, 2017).
109. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, U.N.
Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v.
Commonwealth of Australia, U.N. Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL],
PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011).
110. E.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, U.N.
Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of
Arbitration, ¶¶ 6.7–6.11 (Nov. 21, 2011); FTR Holding S.A. v. Oriental Republic
of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 85 (Feb. 19,
2010).
111. E.g., PHYSICIANS FOR SMOKE-FREE CANADA, supra note 95, at 16–19
(discussing the WIPO’s interpretation of Article 7 of the Paris convention); Mark
Davison & Patrick Emerton, Rights, Privileges, Legitimate Interests, and
Justifiability: Article 20 of TRIPS and Plain Packaging of Tobacco, 29 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 505 (2014).

454

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 18:2

property claim.112 In addition, in both cases Philip Morris argued
a violation of “fair and equitable treatment” of its trademarks.113
There is no domestic analog to this claim which investor-state
tribunals often construe broadly to find a violation, based in
large part on an investor’s “legitimate expectations” that a
government’s laws should not be modified or applied in a manner
that adversely impacts an investor’s investments.114 In the
Australia case, Philip Morris made the most regime-challenging
assertion: that it had a legitimate expectation that Australia
would uphold its commitments under the TRIPS Agreement.115
In addition, there was an umbrella clause claim that Philip
Morris later withdrew in the Australia case according to which
Australia’s TRIPS Agreement obligations were now properly
before the investor-state tribunal.116
Although there are similarities between the two Philip
Morris cases, there is also one difference that highlights why
companies may prefer investor-state disputes to a dispute
espoused on their behalf in the WTO. In the Australia case,

112. E.g., LISE JOHNSON ET AL., COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV.,
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND U.S. DOMESTIC
LAW 7 (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-DisputeSettlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf;
Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International
“Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003).
113. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, U.N.
Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of
Claim, ¶ 8 (June 22, 2011); FTR Holding S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 71 (Feb. 19, 2010).
114. E.g., Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, HostState “Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 361 (2013).
115. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, U.N.
Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of
Arbitration, ¶¶ 6.5, 7.6–7.11 (Nov. 21, 2011).
116. The Tribunal did not reach this issue because the case was dismissed
on challenges to jurisdiction and admissibility. For the umbrella clause claim,
see Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, U.N. Commission on
Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶
7.15–7.17 (Nov. 21, 2011) (claiming failure to comply with TRIPS and Paris
Convention through umbrella clause); FTR Holding S.A. v. Oriental Republic of
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 86 (Feb. 19,
2010) (violation of art. 11 of the Uruguay-Switzerland BIT). For withdrawal of
the umbrella clause claim, see Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of
Australia, U.N. Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], PCA Case No.
2012-12, Procedural Order 8, para. 34 (Apr. 14, 2014).
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Philip Morris brought suit under the Hong Kong-Australia
bilateral investment agreement after corporate restructuring
which took place after Australia announced its intention to
introduce plain packaging measures in 2010.117 Such corporate
restructuring has succeeded in some investment cases where
tribunals effectively permitted “treaty shopping.”118 Australia
successfully asserted that such restructuring by Philip Morris
was abusive and as a result the tribunal did not have jurisdiction
over the case.119
Let us now look at another investor-state case involving IP
rights. As background to discussing this case, it is important to
bear in mind a 2012 publication aimed at actual or potential
corporate clients issued by the global law firm, Jones Day. This
publication encouraged pharmaceutical companies to use
investment agreements as a “new way forward” to address
unfavorable domestic patent laws.120 In addition to explaining
why such agreements are favorable, it argued that the tobacco
case challenging Australia’s laws for violating trademarks was
an example of how investment claims can be brought in lieu of
domestic or WTO claims. It further argued that international
investment arbitration “provides a powerful mechanism to
enforce patent rights around the globe.”121

117. In 2011, Philip Morris Hong Kong formally acquired shares in Philip
Morris Australia to give Philip Morris Hong Kong standing as a foreign investor
under the Hong Kong Australia BIT. E.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v.
Commonwealth of Australia, U.N. Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL],
PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 460 (Dec.
17, 2015).
118. E.g., Rachel Thorn & Jennifer Doucleff, Disregarding the Corporate Veil
and Denial of Benefits Clauses: Testing Treaty Language and the Concept of
Investor, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS
AND REALITY 3, 4 (Michael Waibel et al., eds., 2010); Anne van Aaken, Perils of
Success? The Case of International Investment Protection, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 1, 20 (2008).
119. The Tribunal rejected Philip Morris’ claim that there were legitimate
tax or other business reasons for the restructuring; instead, it found that “the
main and determinative, if not sole, reason for the restructuring was the
intention to bring a claim under the Treaty, using an entity from Hong Kong.”
Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, U.N. Commission on
Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, ¶ 584 (Dec. 17, 2015).
120. Baiju S. Vasani et al., Treaty Protection for Global Patents: A Response
to A Growing Problem for Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies, JONES
DAY (Oct. 2012), http://www.jonesday.com/treaty_protection/.
121. Id. at 3.
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One month after the Jones Day publication, Eli Lilly filed a
notice of intent to submit a claim for arbitration against Canada,
indicating that it would be asserting investment claims against
Canada.122 The factual basis for this claim was that Canadian
courts had invalidated its patent on Straterra, which Eli Lilly
asserted resulted in its patent rights being improperly
“expropriated,” and denied “fair and equitable treatment.” Eli
Lilly subsequently added claims regarding invalidation of
Zyprexa when it filed its Notice of Arbitration in 2013.123
The investment claims are premised on judicial invalidation
of Eli Lilly patents for two commercially successful drugs sold
under the names Strattera and Zyprexa for failing to meet the
“promise doctrine,” a judicial interpretation of the core patent
requirement of utility.124 This doctrine only applies when a
patent applicant, such as Eli Lilly, “promises” that an invention
will have a particular purpose.125 An application satisfies the
promise doctrine if it discloses data to support the promise.126
Eli Lilly had to make these promises because it had already
received at least one full term of patent protection for the basic
chemical compound underlying each drug and was seeking
additional protection after earlier patents had expired.127
122. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under NAFTA
Chapter Eleven (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 7, 2012).
123. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Sept. 12,
2013).
124. Id. at 18–24; see also Eli Lilly Can., Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2011]
F.C.R. 1288 (Can.) (invalidating patent relating to Zyprexa because it promised
fewer side effects than existing antipsychotics used for long term treatment
without any supporting disclosure); Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly Can., Inc.,
[2010] F.C.R. 915 (Can.) (invalidating patent relating to Straterra because it
had an implied promise to treat ADHD as a chronic condition, but did not
disclose efficacy for long term use).
125. E.g., Eli Lilly Can., Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd, [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349, ¶¶ 70–
9 (Can.) (describing the promise doctrine and the specificity of the promised
utility required).
126. Id. ¶113.
127. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case
No. UNCT/14/2, Government of Canada Statement of Defence, ¶ 53
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 30, 2014); see also Cynthia M. Ho,
Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual
Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 239–40 (2015) [hereinafter
Ho, Sovereignty] (explaining how these patents are examples of how companies
engage in the practice of “evergreening” to extend profits over drugs whose
original patents have expired).
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Canada’s promise doctrine is a type of TRIPS flexibility.
TRIPS flexibilities give WTO members discretion to define key
patentability requirements which in turn allows them to limit
patents to truly deserving inventions and promote access to
lower cost drugs.128 Although proponents of these flexibilities
typically suggest interpreting the terms “invention” or “new,”
any core patentability requirement such as Canada’s unique
promise doctrine can provide flexibility.129 Accordingly, Eli
Lilly’s case seeking $500 million in damages against Canada
may make South Africa and Brazil hesitant to enact domestic
laws that embrace these flexibilities even though policy makers
have encouraged them to do so.130 Worse yet, countries that have
laws to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities, such as India, may
feel pressure to jettison such flexibilities to avoid vulnerability
for investment claims. Although India has not specifically
signaled any intent to modify its patent laws, its 2016 model
investment agreement suggests greater encroachment on TRIPS
flexibilities than the proposed 2015 draft.131
128. For a discussion of the genesis of TRIPS flexibilities and what that
entails, see, e.g., World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Comm. on Dev. &
Intellectual Prop., Fifth Session, Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral
Legal Framework and Their Legislative Implementation at the National and
Regional Levels, ¶¶ 29–36, CDIP/5/4 (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www
.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=131629. More recently, the U.N.
High-Level Panel on Access to Medicine defined this term to broadly describe
norms, rules and standards that permit variations in implementations of
TRIPS. Dreifuss & Mogae, supra note 10, at 6.
129. This is one type of TRIPS flexibility. For more examples of TRIPS
flexibilities, see infra Annex Two (describing TRIPS flexibilities).
130. E.g., Chan Park, Achal Prabhala & Jonathan Berger, United Nations
Development Programme [UNDP], Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access
in South Africa: An Analysis of Patent, Competition and Medicines Law, at 46
(Oct. 2013), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js21033en/ (encouraging
legal and regulatory regimes that will encourage pharmaceutical patent growth
in South Africa); UN Report Strengthens Case for Patent Reform in SA and
Other Developing Countries, SECTION 27 (Sept. 15, 2016), http://section27.org.za
/2016/09/un-report-strengthens-case-for-patent-law-reform-in-sa-and-otherdeveloping-countries (describing the U.N. High-Level Panel’s recommendations
as a minimum threshold for South Africa); AMY KAPCZYNSKI & TAMAR EZER,
GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE CTR., SUBMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONSULTATIVE FRAMEWORK (Sept.
2016), http://media.wix.com/ugd/148599_721218272a1c43cbaee5ff8fda3a00cf
.pdf (recommending that TRIPS flexibilities be fully used in South Africa).
131. Compare India’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) art. 2.4(iii)
(2016), http://finmin.nic.in/reports/ModelTextIndia_BIT.pdf (exempting from
revocation, limitation, or creation of rights arguably consistent with TRIPS,
which would permit an investment tribunal to decide this), with Model Text for
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While these investor-state cases were pending, companies
advocated for an investment chapter in the Transpacific
Partnership Agreement. A wide range of actors opposed this
chapter including Senator Elizabeth Warren as well as a
representative of the Cato Institute.132 Companies with interests
in protecting IP through investment agreements, including
pharmaceutical companies and tobacco companies, advocated for
this chapter, and in particular for the inclusion of investor-state
disputes through Trade Advisory Committees which have strong
influence on trade negotiators within the United States’ trade
machinery.133 In fact, these companies were so successful that at
least 80% of the provisions of the TPP’s investment chapter were
borrowed from the United States’ free trade agreements.134
The corporate shift towards investment disputes to protect
IP can also be seen as part of a broader destabilization agenda
regarding public health by tobacco and pharmaceutical
companies. As documented recently by Sergio Puig, the tobacco
industry has pursued thirty-nine international cases
challenging tobacco regulations in at least ten different courts or
tribunals; Philip Morris International, the instigator of the first
investment disputes concerning IP, is involved in one third of
these disputes.135 Although not all such disputes involve IP, they
the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 2.6(v) (2015), https://mygov.in/sites
/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilate
ral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf (excluding from scope of arbitration
compulsory licenses, as well as revocation, limitation of IP if “consistent with
the Law of the Host State”).
132. Daniel J. Ikenson, A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge
Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CATO INST. (Mar. 4, 2014),
https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/compromise-advancetrade-agenda-purge-negotiations-investor-state; Elizabeth Warren, The TransPacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlementlanguage-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html.
133. See, e.g., INDUS. TRADE ADVISORY COMM. FOR CHEMICAL,
PHARMACEUTICALS, HEALTH/SCIENCE PROD. & SERV. [ITAC-3], THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP TRADE AGREEMENT 9 (Dec. 2, 2015), https://ustr
.gov/sites/default/files/ITAC-3-Chemicals-Pharmaceuticals-Health-ScienceProducts-and-Services.pdf.
134. Todd Allee & Andrew Lugg, Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership?, 3 RES. & POL. 1, 9 (2016).
135. Puig, supra note, 12 at 393, n.51. These cases have challenged “import
and export taxes; price, sale, export, and import controls; bans on tobacco
products; marketing and advertisement restrictions; labeling requirements;
and brand registration recognition.” Id.
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are all designed to create uncertainty about the boundaries of
domestic tobacco regulation and directly challenge public health
recommendations of the World Health Organization and U.N.
agencies.136 Moreover, the inevitable delays in implementing
domestic regulations arising from such challenges mean that the
industry continues to maintain profitable sales to fund further
challenges; although regime shifting is a clear goal, the
continuous profit stream minimizes any costs from litigation.137
The pharmaceutical industry has sought to create uncertainty
not only through the Eli Lilly case, but also through a variety of
other challenges. For example, the industry has disputed
domestic measures to require companies to reveal clinical data
and price drugs at lower costs despite the fact that such actions
are consistent with public health recommendations.138 Given the
broader destabilization agenda of these companies, the initial
investment cases here, together with the explicit inclusion of IP
in newer free trade agreements, signal an intent to shift IP
lawmaking and enforcement to the international investment law
regime. Although there is not yet a flood of investment disputes
concerning IP, the history of investment cases suggests that the
tide can quickly turn.139 In addition, even though some might
argue that no regime shift has occurred because the first two
investor-state cases concerning tobacco disputes did not result
in changes to domestic law, the fact that these cases have been
brought and others threatened underscores that a regime shift
is happening.

136. E.g., Tavernise, supra note 13.
137. We thank Martin Bjorklund for pointing this out to us.
138. E.g., Case T-44/13, AbbVie, Inc. v. European Meds. Agency (July 17,
2014) (showing an action by European and American companies against
members of the European Union in order to obtain documents); Case T-73/13R,
InterMune U.K. Ltd. v. European Meds. Agency, 2013 E.C.R. 00000 (Apr. 25,
2013) (showing an action by InterMune to gain third-party access to document);
see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality Laws and
Secrecy in Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety,
26 HEALTH AFF. 483 (2007) (discussing litigation relating to FDA disclosure
rules).
139. Indeed, although there were virtually no investment disputes before
1994, there has been a steep increase in cases to over 600 at the end of 2014.
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2014, fig.1 (July 15, 2015),
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d2_en.pdf.
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B. WHY THE SHIFT COULD POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZE TRIPS
FLEXIBILITIES
As noted earlier, a key feature of regime shifting is using
one regime to destabilize another regime by creating conflicting
norms or seeking to rewrite those norms altogether.140 In our
view, this has been the strategy of tobacco and pharmaceutical
companies not only with respect to investor-state suits, but also
with disputes at the WTO and in national courts.141 For example,
Philip Morris sought to have the investment tribunal require
Uruguay to withdraw the challenged tobacco control regulations
or to refrain from applying them against it.142 This, in addition
to a damage claim of U.S. $22.267 million plus compound
interest, in our view constitutes a significant chilling effect on
countries considering similar tobacco control measures.143 In
addition, the Eli Lilly case against Canada’s promise doctrine
was, in our in view, tailored not only to compel a legislative
change to overrule Canadian case law,144 but also to obtain an
interpretation that will impact the interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement, and to influence the willingness that countries may
otherwise have to use TRIPS flexibilities.145
Although the Philip Morris cases are important wins for
States, they are easy cases relative to potential future cases that
may challenge other TRIPS flexibilities, as we note below. The
wins against tobacco companies are easy because there is little
doubt that tobacco products cause serious public health harms,
and the domestic regulations challenged in those cases were
consistent with the consensus reflected in the WHO’s
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.146 That consensus

140. See supra Part I.
141. Id.
142. FTR Holding S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Arbitration Request, ¶¶ 88–92, 94 (Feb. 19, 2010) (requesting
“suspension” of challenged laws).
143. See Philip Morris Brands Sárl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 2, 2013) (seeking tribunal award damages of
“at least” this amount).
144. E.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v.
Canada and the International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
1121, 1121–22 (2014) (noting the company’s chief patent counsel commented
that the goal was to “fix” the statute to overrule the undesirable case law).
145. Other commentators agree. E.g., id. at 1132.
146. See WHO, supra note 104.
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is reflected, in part, in the carve-out from investor-state disputes
for tobacco in the TPP.147
By contrast, the Eli Lilly dispute against Canada has
attracted much less publicity than the tobacco disputes,
although it in our view represents a much more significant
threat to the domestic regulatory authority than the tobacco
cases. While smoking is a clear public health hazard that entitles
States to use their police power to regulate, as recognized by
consensus in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, there is no such
consensus on whether limiting patent protection, as Canada has
done, is consistent with promoting public health.148 Eli Lilly’s
claims fundamentally stem from the premise held by
multinational pharmaceutical companies that public health is
inherently consistent with stronger patent rights since profits
from patents can fuel research that benefits public health.149
However, this premise is not robustly supported by data;
stronger patent rights lead to more patents, but not necessarily
to more innovation that is beneficial for public health.150 This is
because some IP holders often patent very similar compounds to
extend the patent period so that they can continue charging high

147. TPP, supra note 16, art. 29.5; see also Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, A
Breakthrough with the TPP: The Tobacco Carve-Out, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 327, 327 (2016).
148. For example, after the U.N. convened a High-Level Panel on Access to
Medicine, the WIPO stated that it “‘is sensitive’ to the assumption in the UN
High Level Panel mandate that there is . . . policy incoherence between”
promoting innovation through IP and providing medicine. Catherine Saez, UN
High Level Panel on Access to Medicines – First Reactions, Process Explained,
IP-WATCH (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/02/01/special-featureun-high-level-panel-on-access-to-medicines-first-reactions-process-explained/.
149. E.g., Intellectual Property, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/innovation
/intellectual-property (last visited June 12, 2017) (noting that R&D is promoted
by patent rights); Josh Blooms & Els Torreele, Should Patents on
Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to Encourage Innovation?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23,
2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204542404577156993
191655000 (describing the profit loss companies experience from expired
patents, and discussing whether profits promote innovation). This is arguably
a cognitive bias that has been adopted by academics as well as policy makers.
E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation,
51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 467–72 (2014).
150. Bronwyn H. Hall, Patents and Patent Policy, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 568, 574 (2007); see also Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws Stimulate
Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-Country
Analysis of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 1978–2002, 89 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 436, 436 (2007) (looking at patent protection and pharmaceutical
innovation across twenty-six countries).
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prices beyond the initial patent period—a practice that is
referred to as “evergreening,” since patent protection seems ever
green.151 Although Canada’s challenged patent law is unique, it
is aimed at addressing this well-recognized phenomenon that
other countries including European ones, Australia, and India
have all recognized, and in some cases, enacted laws to
address.152 International human rights legal obligations,
particularly the right to health, are also consistent with this
approach, including the Canadian judiciary’s interpretation of
patent law that Eli Lilly challenged in investor-state dispute
settlement.153 In fact, there are good arguments in favor of ISDS
panels taking these human rights obligations into account when
interpreting Bilateral Investment Treaties and Customary
International Law.154
The Eli Lilly dispute is also much more important to regime
shifting than the tobacco disputes because it directly threatens
long recognized TRIPS flexibilities. The tobacco disputes
primarily addressed TRIPS rules on trademarks, but outside of
tobacco regulation, limiting the use of trademarks has not been
seen as essential to promoting domestic health policy. By
contrast, patent rights, especially on pharmaceuticals have a
151. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40917, PATENT
“EVERGREENING”: ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2009); Janice M.
Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV.
491, 550–56 (2007) (comparing U.S. jurisprudence to Indian domestic patent
law and arguing that Indian law better limits and protects against the harmful
effects of evergreening).
152. E.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY: FINAL
REPORT 453 (2009) (describing this phenomenon in Europe); Mueller supra note
151, at 550–56. (describing this pattern in India); TONY HARRIS ET AL.,
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS REVIEW REPORT 15 (2013) (describing this pattern
in Australia).
153. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. A/HRC/32/L.23/Rev.1 (June 30,
2016) (calling on states to use TRIPS flexibilities to ensure affordable medicine);
Dreifuss & Mogae, supra note 10, at 9 (recommending that nations minimize
evergreening by rigorous definitions of patentability consistent with TRIPs
flexibilities); see also HANNAH BRENNAN ET AL., GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE P’SHIP,
A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES (2013), http://media.wix.com/ugd/148599_c76ed6f7341fa426bc22f5
ccf543ea04.pdf (discussing human rights law as a means to creating greater
access to medicine, despite IP laws).
154. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Global Tobacco Control as a Health and
Human Rights Imperative, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 433 (2016) (arguing that when
tobacco companies challenge national regulations using ISDS, human rights
and public health should be considered).
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significant impact on the cost of drugs, and thus access to
affordable medicine.155 This makes TRIPS Agreement
flexibilities for countries to define key patentability criteria
under TRIPS to make promoting access to affordable medicine
that much more significant. Since the TRIPS Agreement was
concluded, the discretion or flexibility that WTO member
countries have to interpret key terms such as what is an
“invention,” or whether it is “new,” has been understood as key
to their ability to promote affordability and accessibility of
medicines. Public health policy makers consistently recommend
that countries take full advantage of these flexibilities.156 For
example, a recent resolution on access to medicines adopted by
the United Nations Human Rights Council calls on nations to
utilize TRIPS flexibilities.157 In our view, investor-state
disputes, and indeed the threat of such suits particularly for poor
countries, pose a great threat to these already under-utilized
flexibilities. Below we outline some other TRIPS flexibilities that
could potentially be challenged in investor-state arbitration.
1. Patentability Standards
Even though Eli Lilly lost its case, this does not foreclose
similar investor-state challenges. Particularly vulnerable are
countries that tailor their patentability standards based on their
understanding of TRIPS flexibilities.158 Such national
patentability standards are likely to be challenged either as
constituting an expropriation or as a violation of other investor
protections, such as under the fair and equitable treatment
standard. Worse yet, countries that have laws to take advantage
of TRIPS flexibilities, such as India, may feel pressure to jettison
such flexibilities to avoid vulnerability to investment claims.159

155. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 68.
156. E.g., sources cited supra note 130.
157. Human Rights Council Res. A/HRC/32/L.23/Rev.1, supra note 153.
158. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2, Final Award (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Mar. 16, 2017)
[hereinafter Eli Lilly, Award].
159. Even without any known direct threats of investment claims, India has
already bowed to international pressure in recent years. For example, it has
issued a report on a national IP policy that seems more favorable to right
holders than users, contrary to its historical practice. William New &
Patralekha Chatterjee, India Releases New Intellectual Property Policy;
Reactions Building, IP-WATCH (May 13, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016
/05/13/india-releases-new-intellectual-property-policy-reactions-building/.
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A successful challenge of India’s patentability standards could
endanger India’s status as the predominant source of low-cost
generic drugs to the developing world; this is due in large part
to the fact that its patent laws provide less protection for patents
than most other countries.160 If India tightens its patentability
rules pursuant to an investor-state suit or the threat of such a
suit, the only other way that India could continue to make and
sell generics would be to issue compulsory licenses.161 However,
that would likely subject India to a separate basis for an
investment claim. Although many investment agreements
technically have an exception to expropriation claims for
compulsory licenses that are “consistent” with the TRIPS
Agreement, it would be left to an investor-state tribunal rather
than the WTO dispute settlement system to test the consistency
of such a compulsory license with the TRIPS Agreement.162
Moreover, Eli Lilly’s challenge underscores that not only
domestic legislation, but routine common law modification of
existing law is subject to investor disputes. In particular, Eli
Lilly claimed that the promise doctrine was a change to Canada’s
utility requirement, such that it constituted both an
expropriation and violation of fair and equitable standards.163
The tribunal properly rejected the assertion that there was a
dramatic change; rather it said that “departures from precedent
are to be expected” of its utility requirement.164 It also suggested
that common law modifications would need to be “sufficiently
egregious and shocking” to constitute violation of fair and
equitable standards.165 Accordingly, if other tribunals follow this
160. Of course, it is also important that India has capacity to manufacture
generic drugs as well.
161. See infra Annex Two.
162. Indeed, this is the case with Eli Lilly, since NAFTA has such a clause.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1110, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (stating that expropriation
claims do “not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation
to intellectual property rights . . . consistent with Chapter Seventeen
(Intellectual Property)”).
163. Ho, Sovereignty, supra note 127, at 215–16.
164. According to the Eli Lilly Tribunal, what it had before it was “the
invalidation by the Canadian judiciary of the Zyprexa and Strattera Patents
through application of the promise utility doctrine.” Eli Lilly, Award, supra note
158, ¶ 165.
165. See Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 158, ¶ 222, where with regard to the
minimum standard of treatment of Article 1105, the Tribunal adopts the test
that for there to be a violation, the act in question must be “sufficiently
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approach, common law changes to patent law, such as recent US
narrowing of patentability should not result in a successful
investment claim.
2. Data Exclusivity
Yet another possible TRIPS flexibility at risk relates to
undisclosed information as required under Article 39 of the
TRIPS Agreement.166 Although this provision is not regarded as
a patent right, it is generally considered a patent flexibility since
it complements patent protection.167 Part of the reason why this
presents an opportunity for investors is that there are extremely
divergent views on what the TRIPS Agreement requires under
Article 39. Some countries and companies believe that it
requires United States-style “data exclusivity,” that bars generic
companies from relying on the clinical data of a pioneer drug for
obtaining regulatory approval for a certain period of time.168
Other scholars, policy makers, and some countries, by contrast,
consider it to only require “data protection,” which means
protecting the data submitted to a regulatory agency from unfair
competition, but not necessarily reliance on the data by a generic
company that never has physical access to the data.169 A few take
an intermediate position and find that the TRIPS Agreement

egregious and shocking—a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness,
blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a
manifest lack of reasons.”
166. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 39.
167. E.g., MATTHIAS LAMPING ET AL., MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION, RESEARCH PAPER NO. 14-19, DECLARATION ON PATENT
PROTECTION: REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER TRIPS (2014), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2500784 (including this within the
scope of flexibilities for patent rights).
168. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 314.108 (2012) (including a five year period of
exclusivity in the United States); NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS
REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 392–93 (2d ed. 2005).
169. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 383–92 (2007); Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration
Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM.
J.L. & MED. 303, 315–16 (2008) (arguing that patents and evergreening are not
complete protections); Jerome H. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Test Data
Under the TRIPS Agreement and Its Progeny: A Broader Perspective (paper
presented at Moving the Pro-Development IP Agenda Forward: Preserving
Public Goods in Health, Education and Learning, Bellagio, Italy, Nov. 29–Dec.
3, 2004) (describing treaties and trade concessions for patent protections).
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precludes generic companies from relying on the data of another
company without paying some fee.170
India permits a generic manufacturer to immediately rely
on the clinical data of an originator company to establish
bioequivalence to the original in seeking approval of the generic
any time after approval of the originator company.171 This means
that although the originator invested substantial time and
money in developing clinical data, the generic company can rely
on that data and invest a small amount of money in bringing the
generic equivalent to market.172 Although innovator companies
complain this is fundamentally unfair,173 they generally fail to
note that the rationale for data exclusivity is identical to that of
patent protection, such that providing both types of protection is
duplicative.174 In addition, such companies do not highlight that
data exclusivity effectively provides more protection than
patents by absolutely barring generic entry—even if the
patented drug may in fact be subject to an invalid patent since
the majority of drug patents are found invalid when
challenged.175 If there is no data exclusivity, a country can
quickly approve a generic equivalent and let the generic
company legally contest whether the drug is properly patented
or not. A generic company is not likely to undertake such a

170. E.g., SHAMNAD BASHEER, PROTECTION OF REGULATORY DATA UNDER
ARTICLE 39.3 OF TRIPS: THE INDIAN CONTEXT 28–29 (2009) (looking at a model
of compensating creators of data for usage); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy,
Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law:
Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 443, 446 (2004) (arguing for a functional equivalent to patents in
“trade secret status”). However, this interpretation seems to be inconsistent
with the appropriate interpretation of TRIPS since there was an explicit
proposal to require cost-sharing, that was rejected. Reichman, supra note 169,
at 10.
171. E.g., CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 119 (2011)
[hereinafter HO 2011].
172. Id.
173. See generally ORG. OF PHARM. PRODUCERS OF INDIA, OPPI POSITION
PAPER: REGULATORY DATA PROTECTION – A BUILDING BLOCK FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D (2008) (arguing for the fairness of data protection).
174. E.g., Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 419, 430–32 (2012) (describing the similarities and differences between
patents and statutory exclusivities).
175. E.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 152, ¶ 501; FED. TRADE COMM’N,
GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 20 (2002).
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contest lightly given the risks of litigation, but at least the public
interest in lower cost generics is recognized and not stifled; this
seems particularly important if a patent were in fact invalid.
A company could claim that a country that does not provide
data exclusivity is indirectly expropriating its data in investorstate arbitration. After all, clinical data is expensive to develop
and thus would seem to easily fall within the definition of an
investment. In addition, although most investment agreements
provide an exception to indirect expropriation for denial of
intellectual property rights consistent with the TRIPS
Agreement, lack of data exclusivity is not a prototypical denial
of rights in the same way as a denial of a patent application.176
In particular, there is no specific application for data exclusivity;
in countries that provide this protection, it is provided
automatically when a drug is approved by the domestic
regulatory agency.177 Moreover, the exception would still result
in an investment tribunal, rather than a WTO panel deciding on
whether or not this is permissible under the TRIPS Agreement.
In addition, even if there is no finding of indirect expropriation
for a country that declines to provide data exclusivity, this could
still be the basis for a claim of violation of fair and equitable
treatment. A company could make a claim similar to Philip
Morris in the Australia case that it has a legitimate interest in
a country “complying” with the TRIPS Agreement by providing
data exclusivity based on its belief that this is what the TRIPS
Agreement requires.178 This would have a potentially serious
chilling effect on the ability of countries to decline to provide
data exclusivity as a type of TRIPS flexibility.
3. Compulsory Licensing
Another likely target of an investor-state arbitration would
be a compulsory license. A compulsory license is a statemandated license to make and use a patented invention in
situations where public policy counsels that the patent owners
should not be permitted typical exclusivity and ability to charge
a patent premium.179 Although this situation seems inapposite
176. Heled, supra note 174, at 431.
177. Id.
178. See Philip Morris Brands Sárl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶¶ 340–45 (July 2, 2013).
179. JEROME H. REICHMAN & CATHERINE HASENZAHL, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (ICTSD) AND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
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of the patent right to exclude, one of the reasons compulsory
licenses have historically been granted is to promote public
interest, including a desire to ensure that patents on medical
products were not unduly costly.180 The TRIPS Agreement
continues to permit nations authorities to grant such licenses by
specifying the procedural requirements that must be complied
with, including that the patent owner be provided “adequate
remuneration.”181 However, any issued compulsory licenses are
likely to be challenged as constituting an expropriation since
companies often regard compulsory licenses as either “breaking”
their patents, or as expropriating their patent rights.182 Scholars
have been expecting such claims.183 A compulsory license may
very well represent a prototypical situation in which an investor
believes that it needs and deserves the additional protection of
investor-state arbitration because domestic laws and
institutions are perceived to unfairly permit the state to seize
their IP rights, regardless of the fact that this is permissible
under state and international law.184
The ability to issue compulsory licenses is especially
important now because countries no longer have the freedom to
completely deny patents on drugs as many had done before
TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED
INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS,
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA 6 (2003).
180. Id. at 10–13.
181. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. An amendment to the TRIPS Agreement
allowing countries with pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to
manufacture drugs for countries without such capacity under a compulsory
license came into effect in January 2017. See WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease
Poor Countries’ Access to Affordable Medicines, WTO (Jan. 23, 2017), https://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/trip_23jan17_e.htm.
182. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 1047, 1069–70 (2009) (discussing characterization as “breaking”
patents); see also Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck & Co., Inc. Statement
on Brazilian Government’s Decision to Issue Compulsory License for
STOCRIN™ (May 4, 2007) (printed by Business Wire), http://www
.businesswire.com/news/home/20070504005566/en/Merck-StatementBrazilian-Governments-Decision-Issue-Compulsory (referring to compulsory
license as expropriation).
183. E.g., Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITs: An Essay on Compulsory
Licenses, Expropriation, and International Arbitration, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
ONLINE 149, 161 (2012) (describing expropriation disputes); Christopher
Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case
of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 357, 359 (2010) (forecasting a
rise in IPR disputes).
184. See Ho, Sovereignty, supra note 127.
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TRIPS.185 However, countries are typically wary of using these
rights. For example, although Colombia has recently taken steps
to issue a compulsory license on a cancer drug sold as Gleevec
that is currently sold at a cost that is nearly double Colombia’s
per capita income,186 it has not actually issued a license due to
serious opposition.187 In particular, a U.S. threat to revoke a
prior offer to provide millions of dollars in aid to back Colombian
peace initiatives seems to have been a factor in Colombia’s
reluctance to issue a compulsory license.188 Since withdrawal of
promised aid seems to make an impact, the threat of having to
pay millions to defend against an investment suit that could
result in hundreds of millions in damages could have a serious
chilling effect on countries issuing compulsory licenses. This is
particularly problematic since countries have already been
hesitant to issue compulsory licenses without the threat of
investor-state arbitration.
C. FURTHER RISKS POSED TO THE IP COMPLEX BY THE NATURE
OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION THAT COULD POTENTIALLY
EXACERBATE TRIPS DESTABILIZATION
To further emphasize why this latest regime shift to
investor-state arbitration poses a huge threat of destabilizing
185. E.g., SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICALS
INDUSTRY: PATENT PROTECTION, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 59
(2005) (citing Julio J. Nogués, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs:
Understanding the Pressures on Developing Countries, J. WORLD TRADE 81, 83
(1990) (noting nearly fifty countries that did not provide patent protection on
drug or drug compounds)); see also TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27(1) (requiring
patent protection on all inventions).
186. James Love & Andrew S. Goldman, Inside Views: Colombia Asked to
Declare Excessive Price for Cancer Drug Contrary to Public Interest, Grounds
for Compulsory License, IP-WATCH (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org
/2015/12/03/colombia-asked-to-declare-excessive-price-for-cancer-drugcontrary-to-public-interest-grounds-for-compulsory-license/.
187. Andrew Goldman & Thiru Balasubramaniam, Switzerland Pressures
Colombia to Deny Compulsory License on Imbatinib, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L (Aug. 18, 2015), http://keionline.org/node/2312.
188. Zach Carter, Colombia Fears U.S. May Reject Peace Plan to Protect
Pharma Profits, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 2016, 10:47 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/colombia-gleevec_us_5733d4ece4b077d4d6f224ee.
Columbia instead issued a public interest declaration to lower the price of
Glivec, which led to a price reduction of over 40%. E.g., Andrew Goldman,
Colombia Finalizes 44% Price Reduction of Leukemia Drug Glivec, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Dec. 21, 2016, 10:06 AM), http://www.keionline.org/node/2705.
Although Columbia’s approach does seem to address complaints about
compulsory licenses, Columbia may have nonetheless made itself susceptible to
an investor-state claim for expropriation or FET based on this price reduction.
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TRIPS flexibilities, this section considers how the nature of
investor-state arbitration makes this outcome more likely than
not and the risks it poses to the IP regime complex as a result.
This section will do so by comparing and contrasting features of
investor-state dispute settlement with the WTO’s dispute
settlement system as well as that found in domestic legal
systems.
1. Adjudication of Investment Claims Differs from WTO
Disputes in a Pro-Investor Sense
Investment claims give investors the right to seek
substantial financial compensation as damages from states that
violate their rights, which is not possible in other situations. For
example, a state that seeks to espouse an investor’s case in the
WTO does not have a right to damages since WTO disputes are
designed to bring laws into compliance with WTO obligations,
rather than to impose financial penalties. Although investors
may seek compensation under domestic law, they are less likely
to succeed than in investor-state arbitration since domestic
courts tend to be more deferential to the regulatory authority of
their states. Indeed, when the tobacco companies challenged
regulations in Uruguay and Australia, they failed.189 In
Australia, the highest courts decided that the plain packaging
legislation did not constitute a domestic taking since trademarks
only provide a right to exclude, and not an affirmative right to
use.190 Similarly, the Eli Lilly investment claim against Canada
could had resulted in a financial win—and windfall—in a
context where Canadian courts concluded that Eli Lilly had no
cognizable patent rights under Canadian law and Eli Lilly did
not bring a domestic taking.191 In that particular case, the
tribunal wisely recognized that it should not function as an
appellate body overseeing domestic decisions. However, whether
other tribunals will follow a similar approach remains to be seen.
In addition, investment claims are also notably different—
and problematic—because they can be brought even if a country
is arguably in full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. In the
WTO, countries are given significant authority to decide how to
189. See Philip Morris Brands Sárl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 2, 2013).
190. JT Int’l SA v. Commonwealth, [2012] 250 CLR 1 (Austl.); British
American Tobacco Australasia LTD v. Commonwealth, [2012] Matter No.
S389/2011.
191. E.g., Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly Can., Inc. [2010] F.C.R. 915 (Can.).
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define terms, such as what is an “invention,” but that flexibility
would not necessarily persuade an investor-state tribunal that
an invention that constituted an investment had not been
expropriated. Although most investment agreements recognize
that revocation of patent rights, as was the situation with Eli
Lilly, is not an expropriation if it complies with TRIPS, this still
permits an investment tribunal to decide whether such a
revocation is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. The Eli Lilly
case demonstrates that companies may seek “interpretations” of
TRIPS by investment tribunals that defy conventional
interpretations.192 Moreover, since the primary goal of bilateral
investment treaties is to promote investment and protect
investor rights, a tribunal might be more inclined towards views
of IP owners, such as Eli Lilly.193 Some scholars have suggested
that tribunals should be sensitive and sympathetic to TRIPS
Agreement flexibilities194 as reflected in its preamble,195 as well
as in the “principles and “objectives” clauses.196 There is also
some support for this from WTO Panel Reports.197 In addition,
192. E.g., Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment
and Intellectual Property Law, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 121, 139–41 (2016) (noting
that Eli Lilly’s claim that the definition of patent utility should not change after
NAFTA was enacted defies analysis pursuant to the Vienna Convention).
193. This is particularly true in most older-type agreements such as NAFTA
that lack any language suggesting that other policy norms be balanced. See, e.g.,
Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?—Intellectual Property Rights,
Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment
Agreements, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 252 (2015).
194. E.g., Frankel, supra note 192; see also sources cited infra note 196
(discussing limited WTO panel use of TRIPS flexibility).
195. TRIPS, supra note 2, pmbl. (“Recognizing that intellectual property
rights are private rights . . . Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives
of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
developmental and technological objectives.”).
196. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 7 (listing the “objectives” clause which states
that agreement should benefit both producers and users of innovation in a
balanced manner that recognizes social and economic welfare); id. art. 8 (listing
the “Principles” clause which explicitly recognizes that WTO members are
entitled to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition,
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development”).
197. E.g., Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R (adopted Mar. 17, 2000) (stating that “both
the goals and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be
borne in mind” when interpreting other TRIPS provisions); Panel Report,
European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WTO Doc. WT/DS174/R
(adopted Mar. 15, 2005) (noting that article 8 provides member states “Freedom
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its design as a “minimum,” rather than as a uniform set of rules
supports the discretion WTO members have to balance the
protection of IP rights with competing interests such as public
health.198 WTO Panel Reports have also noted that the
minimum standards framework means that member states have
discretion on how to implement those minimum standards.199
So, although patentability requirements such as what is a “new”
or “useful” invention are widely understood under TRIPS to be
terms that a country can flexibly define to address domestic
priorities, Eli Lilly argued that its interpretation of what is
“useful” should instead govern. Notwithstanding the fact that
the tribunal never got to the merits of Eli Lilly’s claim on this
issue, this investor-state dispute could still have a chilling effect
on poor states from enacting TRIPS-consistent legislation
because they cannot afford to defend against such a claim.200
Notably, even though Canada won, the tribunal explicitly stated
that it did not consider Eli Lilly’s claims to be frivolous.201
We acknowledge that chilling effects can be hard to
document. After all, countries could decline to adopt domestic
legislation consistent with TRIPS flexibility for many reasons
other than because they have received a specific threat of
investment dispute being filed against them. However, the
tobacco industry has warned not only Canada against enacting
tobacco regulations,202 but also a wide range of developed and
developing countries.203 Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry
to pursue legitimate public policy objectives” outside the scope of intellectual
property rights).
198. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1.
199. Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted
Jan. 26, 2009) (stating that article 1.1. “grants freedom to determine the
appropriate method of implementation”); Panel Report, India - Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS50/AB/R (adopted Dec. 19, 1997) (“Members . . . are free to determine
how best to meet their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement within the
context of their own legal systems.”).
200. The risk of ISDS interpretations identified here is addressed by
treating ISDS interpretations of domestic law—EU law in the case of the CETA
Article 8.31 and the November 2015 TTIP proposal Article 3.3—as incidental
and factual.
201. See Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 158, ¶ 455(b).
202. For regulations, we are including, but not limiting, our reference to
laws that promote “plain packaging” of cigarettes.
203. See sources cited supra note 18 and accompanying text (developing
countries); see also Sean O’Neal, Tobacco Company that Relies on Skewing Facts
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has used a variety of mechanisms to promote its IP interests and
to impede domestic action perceived to impact such interests.
This includes litigation, lobbying decision-makers outside formal
participatory and consultative channels and without public
disclosure, and public “educational” campaigns that reflect their
view.204
Canada’s successful defense against Eli Lilly’s investment
suit does not reduce the potential that investor-state cases
challenging patentability standards, including this case, could
still have a significant chilling effect on the already limited use
of TRIPS flexibilities. After all, Canada has significantly more
resources than poorer countries that may lack the resources to
mount a strong legal defense. Further, although Canada
prevailed in a unanimous decision, it still paid more than $1
million in attorney fees. Such costs are a substantial disincentive
for a poorer country gambling on the odds of winning. As we have
argued throughout this paper, the mere threat of an investment
claim seeking millions of dollars has a chilling effect on the
willingness of those governments to proceed with regulatory
goals to protect public health that investors have protested as
inconsistent with their investment rights.
Although the verification of potential chilling effects will
likely need to happen after this article is published, we have
gathered some information in Annex One to this article
documenting the variety of challenges made by companies in
response to efforts to regulate tobacco or to use TRIPS
flexibilities. This information discloses that companies engage in
a broad-range of concerted efforts, short of filing investor-state
disputes, to prevail on states not to enact laws that are perceived
to unduly limit desired IP rights.205

Decries John Oliver for Skewing Facts, AV CLUB (Feb. 17, 2015, 12:56 PM),
http://www.avclub.com/article/tobacco-company-relies-skewing-facts-decriesjohn--215375.
204. E.g., HO 2011, supra note 171, at 327–48.
205. Although Annex One, infra, is not an exhaustive list of all the concerted
initiatives of IP companies to prevail on states not to regulate their IP rights, it
nevertheless demonstrates the combination of strategies that these IP
companies use to achieve regulatory chill in their favor. The Annex documents,
by country, the laws or regulations on tobacco regulation in question, the date
on which they were proposed or came into effect, and legal and other challenges
made by IP companies against these laws or regulations.
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2. The Adjudicatory Process of Investor-State Cases is Heavily
Weighted in Favor of Investors
A notable feature of investor-state claims is that they give
investors a right to sue states for violating rights embodied in
investment treaties made between states. However, this is a
relatively new development. Until the middle of the twentieth
century, state to state claims were the predominant mode of
international dispute settlement and investors had to persuade
their home State to espouse a case on their behalf. Allowing
investors to bring suits against states was therefore considered
a “revolutionary innovation” in international law.206 This is a
very important distinction since states tend to be cautious in
asserting claims against other states and weigh a number of
political considerations. For example, although countries have
often asserted the existence of TRIPS Agreement violations,
there have been extremely few disputes initiated under the
TRIPS Agreement.207 Corporations, by contrast, do not have
similar political considerations and might be inclined to file
claims to encourage a settlement, which is often in their favor.208
Moreover, companies have been bringing an increasing number
of investment claims in recent years. This may in part be
attributable to broadly interpreted claims by some tribunals,
especially with respect to what constitutes violation of the vague
term “fair and equitable treatment.” Although such claims were
at one point rare, they are now often broadly interpreted to bar
countries from violating the “legitimate interests” of investors.209
One commentator has noted that such broad FET claims “cover
206. BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, U.N. Commission on Int’l
Trade L. [UNCITRAL] Final Award, ¶ 145 (Dec. 24, 2007) (stating that the
proliferation of bilateral investment treaties has caused a “profound
transformation of international investment law,” including “[entitling
investors] to seek enforcement of their treaty rights by directly bringing action
against the State in whose territory they have invested”); Jan Paulsson,
Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 256 (1995) (“It is dramatically
different from anything previously known in the international sphere.”).
207. As just one example, countries that issue compulsory licenses are
frequently criticized for violating TRIPS, but there has never been a WTO
dispute.
208. E.g., LAUGE SKOVGAARD POULSEN ET AL., LONDON SCH. OF ECON.,
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EU-US INVESTMENT PROTECTION TREATY 28, 30
(2013).
209. E.g., Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, HostState “Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 361 (2013).
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all conceivable cases.”210 Indeed, such claims are commonly
brought and are the most successful investment claims.211
Dispute settlement in the investment regime is also
significantly different than in the WTO. Dispute settlement in
the WTO between two countries allows other WTO member
countries to participate as third parties, which in turn allows
them to have a voice in the determination of issues that
implicate their interests. Moreover, there is an Appellate Body
that has jurisdiction to review Panel decisions on questions of
law. By contrast, investor-state dispute settlements,
particularly those hosted by the International Center for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) are dominated by
high-powered, elite private lawyers or legal academics from
Europe and the United States who have more experience in the
primarily private and commercial law oriented investor-state
arbitration system than in the more public law oriented dispute
settlement system of the WTO.212 In an ICSID pool of 311 cases,
77% of the cases were decided by a small group of 39 arbitrators,
and of this group 39% had one of the ‘top’ group of elite
arbitrators. In addition, 29% of these cases there were two such
‘top’ arbitrators and in 9% of these cases, all three arbitrators
were in this top niche of arbitrators.213 A major explanation for
these repeat appointments of a small cadre of arbitrators is that
the system of party-appointed ‘private judges’ in investor-state
arbitration consists of one group consistently appointed by
investors, and another group consistently appointed by states.214
Some recent empirical evidence strongly suggests that
investor recovery increases by at least 39% when investor-state
210. F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, 52 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 241, 243 (1981).
211. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Recent
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/3/REV, at 5 (2013).
212. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of
Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators Are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from
Venus, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 761 (2015); Joseph Weiler, European Hypocrisy: TTIP
and ISDS, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/europeanhypocrisy-ttip-and-isds/ (explaining that investor-state arbitration is
“dominated by arbitrators from private practice rather than public interest
backgrounds”).
213. Sergio Puig, Blinding International Justice, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 647
(2017).
214. Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 387, 402 (2014).
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arbitration panels have a majority of pro-investor arbitrators
and a State is found liable.215 In addition, where there was only
one pro-state arbitrator and a pro-investor arbitrator, the
evidence suggested the recovery rate of a state reduced to
23%.216 To compound this problem, many elite arbitrators act as
counsel or as party-appointed experts when not sitting as an
arbitrator which in turn creates conflicts.217 Although there are
rules that aim to ensure integrity of arbitrators, this ad hoc
dispute settlement system is still quite different than national
judicial systems, or even the dispute settlement system of the
WTO that have more established mechanisms of accountability
and transparency built into them.
There is also a high level of confidentiality relating to
hearings and written submissions in investor-state arbitration.
This confidentiality is a function of the fact that such
arbitrations were based on the private commercial arbitral
dispute settlement model involving solely private parties where
there may be a greater justification for secrecy to protect
business interests.218 Typically, only parties to the dispute have
full access to all the information relating to investor-state
disputes, yet unlike in a dispute between private parties,
investor-state arbitrations often implicate major public policy
issues.219
There is also limited ability for third parties to participate
even when these cases raise public policy issues. In stark
contrast to the WTO system, the vast majority of investment
cases do not guarantee any direct participation by third parties.
Although investment tribunals have authority to permit amicus
215. Puig, supra note 213, at 684.
216. Id.
217. E.g., NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., ARBITRATOR INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY:
EXAMINING THE DUAL ROLE OF ARBITRATOR AND COUNSEL (2010); see also
David Graukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A
Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community, (Org. Econ. Cooperation &
Dev. Working Papers on Inte’l Inv. 2012/03, 2012) (stating that a majority of
arbitrators have served as counsel for investors in other cases whereas only 10%
of arbitrators have acted as counsel for states in other cases).
218. See Frank J. Garcia et al., Reforming the International Investment
Regime: Lessons from International Trade Law, 18 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 861, 871–
72 (2015).
219. E.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent
Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1544–45 (2005).
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briefs from third parties in limited circumstances,220 non-parties
must petition tribunals who then have discretion to decide
whether to grant this permission after consulting with the
disputing parties.221 Even if participation is granted,
effectiveness may be hampered by inability to obtain access to

220. Notably, the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules as revised in 2006
allow for participation of amicus briefs, but only if they provide a different
perspective than the disputing parties, the submission addresses a matter
within the scope of the dispute, and the non-disputing party has a significant
interest in the proceeding. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration
Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), 37(2) (permitting third parties to file amicus
submission), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/partfchap04.htm; see also UNICTRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based
Investor-State Arbitration art. 5 (2014) (concerning submission by a nondisputing party to the treaty). For further discussion and assessment of the
openness of investment disputes to third party intervention, see James Fry &
Odysseas Repousis, Towards a New World for Investor State Arbitration
Through Transparency, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 705 (2016); Katia Gomez,
Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration:
How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
510 (2012); Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment
Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third Party Participation, 29
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. (2011); Alberto Salazar, Defragmenting International
Investment Law to Protect Citizen-Consumers: The Role of Amici Curiae and
Public Interest Groups, 19 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 183 (2013).
221. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration
Rules), 37(2) (explaining that the disputing parties do not have an absolute veto
right and there are situations where amicus submissions are granted in spite of
objections of the investor), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles
/basicdoc/partf-chap04.htm. Nonetheless, this is obviously a very different
process than in the WTO.
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all documents,222 or to attend oral proceedings.223 Recognizing
some of these deficiencies, some newer proposed or recently
concluded agreements permit broader access to third parties,
including in one case an actual right to intervention.224 However,
this is only true for some agreements and also notably does not
apply retroactively to the vast majority of existing
agreements.225
In addition, unlike in the WTO, the vast majority of
investor-state claims are not subject to appeal;226 awards can be
annulled under a limited set of circumstances;227 however, these
222. For example, the 2003 Statement of the Free Trade Commission on
Non-Disputing Party Participation regarding NAFTA does not require access to
documents. NAFTA, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on NonDisputing Party Participation, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization
/38791.pdf; see also Camilla Graham, Amicus Curiae & Investment Arbitrations:
Part 2, A4ID ADVOCATES FOR INT’L DEV. 10 (2012); Salazar, supra note 220, at
186; Epaminontas Triantafilou, A More Expansive Role for Amici Curiae in
Investment Arbitration?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, (May 11, 2009),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2009/05/11/a-more-expansive-role-for-amicicuriae-in-investment-arbitration/. Indeed, in one case, a tribunal explicitly
noted that non-disputing parties did not require materials to submit informed
briefs. Aguas Argentinas, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation
as Amicus Curiae, (May 19, 2005). But see TPP, supra note 16, art. 23(3) (stating
that if an intervention is granted, the intervener may obtain copies of
procedural documents except in cases of confidentiality); Piero Foresti v.
Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Award, (Aug. 4, 2010)
(requiring parties to disclose briefs to amicus intervenors).
223. In most cases, this is only possible with consent of disputing parties and
either disputing party has an absolute veto right on this possibility. ICSID
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), 32(2),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/partf-chap04.htm.
Some investment agreements may, on the other hand require open hearings.
E.g., Dominican Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade
Agreement arts. 10.17.2(a), 10.21 (2005); TPP, supra note 16, art. 9.24(2);
CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.36(5).
224. TTIP, supra note 31, art. 23 (“The Tribunal shall permit any natural or
legal person which can establish a direct and present interest in the result of
the dispute (the intervener) to intervene as a third party.”).
225. Even in recent agreements, amicus briefs are not guaranteed. Compare
TPP, supra note 16, art. 9.22 (stating that tribunals may accept non-disputing
party amicus curiae submissions under certain conditions), with CETA, supra
note 31, art. 8.38 (stating that the tribunal shall accept non-disputing party
submissions).
226. The lack of review of such awards was recently reinforced when the U.S.
Supreme Court held that domestic courts must not review their merits. BC
Group v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1201–02 (2014).
227. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration
Rules), art. 52, http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc
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are usually unsuccessful.228 Indeed, when the EU initiated a
public consultation in 2014 to address concern about such
disputes, one of the most important areas of concern for the
public was the protection of the right of a country to regulate
without the possibility of review by arbitral tribunals and the
absence of appellate mechanisms to review arbitral tribunal
decisions for legal correctness.229 The EU has since included an
appellate mechanism in its investment agreement with
Vietnam, as well as in CETA.230 Although this is a promising
sign for future agreements, it obviously does not permit appeals
in other agreements.

/parta-chap04.htm (permitting annulment if the tribunal was not properly
constituted, the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers, there was corruption
by a member, there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure, or the award failed to state the reasons on which it was based); G.A.
Res 40/72, art. 34 (Dec. 4, 2006) (listing limited grounds for setting aside an
award); see also Albert Jan van den Berg, Should the Setting Aside of Arbitral
Award Be Abolished?, 29 ICSID REV. 1 (2014) (explaining origins and current
status of setting aside awards in international arbitration); Press Release, Jose
Alvarez et al., International Law Experts Respond to Alliance for Justice ISDS
Letter (Apr. 8, 2015) (stating that “awards are subject to review either in
national courts or by ad hoc annulment committees composed of representatives
drawn from rosters created by states”).
228. E.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Recent
Trends in IIAS and ISDS, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2015/1, at 8
(Feb. 2015) (noting that all five applications for annulment in 2014 were
entirely rejected). But see HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS LLP, ICSID Annulment
Awards: The Fourth Generation?, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 18, 2011), https://www
.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7218cb56-7a64-426f-8cc0-8475303444e6
(suggesting that in some cases, annulment proceedings have been more akin to
appellate review despite lack of support from language of ICSID).
229. European Comm’n., Comm. Staff Working Document, Report: Online
Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor-to-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
Agreement (TTIP), SWD(2015) 3 Final 18, 24 (Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec
.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf
[hereinafter
Eur.
Comm’n Working Document] (noting that vast majority of comments agree
concerning the right to ensure a balance between investment protection and
right to regulate, as well as broad support in favor of an appellate mechanism,
with some considering it indispensable).
230. DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO VIETNAM, GUIDE TO THE EUVIETNAM FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 27, 54 (discussing various opportunities for
parties
to
appeal),
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/vietnam
/documents/eu_vietnam/evfta_guide.pdf.
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III. LOOKING AHEAD – LEANING ON AND EXTENDING
THE LESSONS LEARNED SO FAR
Given the potential for investor-state arbitration to
destabilize domestic and international IP norms, including
TRIPS flexibilities, this Part proposes strategies to counter this
outcome. First, we recommend limiting application of investorstate claims to TRIPS norms by defining with more clarity and
precision key terms in investment chapters and agreements.
Second, we recommend improving the investment dispute
process particularly with respect to disputes that arise under
existing investment agreements. These suggestions are in
addition to options already available to States such as
terminating agreements to minimize liability for future
claims.231 The suggestions focus solely on the new regime shift
from the WTO to the international investment law regime, but
may not address future regime shifts to yet-to-be determined
regimes. After all, regime shift theory suggests that actors are
constantly seeking to shift to preferable regimes, such that
regime shifting in general is unlikely to be stopped. However, we
make proposals to minimize the most negative impacts of the IP
regime shift we have identified. At the same time, although
these proposals are aimed to combat the IP regime shift, some of
the proposals may address broader concerns regarding the
investment arena that apply beyond IP.
A. LIMITING THE INTRUSION OF THE INVESTMENT REGIME ON IP
NORMS
There are a variety of ways in which countries can limit the
extent to which the investment regime interferes with
negotiated IP norms and obligations. Subsection 1 focuses on
how pending and future agreements could provide more clarity
and precision of key investor protections and the rights of States.
Subsection 2 offers suggestions for improving the procedures of
investor-state dispute settlement to safeguard a better balance
between the rights of states and investors in the IP context.
1. Carve-Outs of IP Claims from ISDS
One way to mitigate the conflict between international
agreements protecting investors and those protecting IP rights
is to carve-out certain IP claims from ISDS in pending and future
231. Indeed, South Africa and Indonesia have already done so. See sources
cited supra note 18.
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investment treaties. This can take a variety of forms including a
carve-out for all claims, only some types of investment claims, or
a requirement of additional specific consent. There is already
precedent for carving out specific subject areas, including
national security, some types of tax,232 financial institutions,233
real estate,234 and most recently tobacco regulation.235 Many
agreements currently have what could be considered a carve-out
for IP claims from expropriation, although it is not a true carve
out since it only excludes claims of expropriation that are
consistent with TRIPS; this will thus result in an investment
case proceeding to assess TRIPS consistency.236 Accordingly, an
actual carve out must go beyond expropriation claims.
Alternatively, if TRIPS-based IP rights were not entirely
precluded, limiting claims to only state to state cases would be
an improvement. Even though conflict would not be completely
eliminated, it would better parallel the WTO process and at least
reduce the number of likely conflicts because states are more
discerning in bringing disputes.237 Another approach could
involve only allowing investors to bring investor-state claims
that implicate TRIPS if there is prior specific consent by the host
232. E.g., TPP, supra note 16, art. 29.4, (no FET claims for tax); see also
William Park, Tax Arbitration and Investor Protection, in THE FUTURE OF
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 227, 238 (Catherine A Rogers & Roger P Alford eds.,
2009).
233. Agreement between Canada and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Jordan, June 28, 2009, art.
21, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/617.
234. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Republic of Cameroon Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Cameroon, Apr. 24, 2012, art. 10.4(c),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/597.
235. TPP, supra note 16, art. 29.5. However, whether this will survive the
ratification stage is unclear. E.g., Lukasz Gruszczynski, The Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement and the ISDS Carve-Out for Tobacco Control Measures,
6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 652 (2015); Wendy Parmet, Trade, Health, and Tobacco
Exceptionalism: The TPP Tobacco Carve Out, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 10,
2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/11/10/trade-health-and-tobaccoexceptionalism-the-tpp-tobacco-carve-out/.
236. E.g., TPP, supra note 16, art. 9.8.5. The Eli Lilly dispute illustrates the
fact that such a clause does not obviate a dispute since there is a similar clause
under NAFTA.
237. E.g., Sean Flynn, How the Leaked TPP ISDS Chapter Threatens
Intellectual Property Limitations and Exceptions, IP-WATCH (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/03/26/how-the-leaked-tpp-isds-chapterthreatens-intellectual-property-limitations-and-exceptions/ (recognizing and
suggesting this approach).
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nation, as is already done with some tax claims.238 Although
some might suggest that taxes are more essential to domestic
sovereignty and thus entitled to different rules that do not apply
to other areas, some commentators have noted that this
distinction is not robust.239
Alternatively, the definition of applicable investment could
be narrowed to minimize conflicts between the TRIPS
Agreement and investment treaties. For example, the definition
of an investment could be clarified to exclude a mere application
for an IP right.240 This would be consistent with long-recognized
intellectual property policy that there are no rights attendant to
a mere application.241 In addition, denials of applications and
revocations of intellectual property could be entirely excluded
from the scope of investments where they are consistent with
domestic law, as decided by domestic courts, unless there is
denial of justice arising from procedural irregularities.242 Using
238. E.g., Energy Charter Treaty, art. 21(5), http://www.energycharter.org
/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf (for expropriation claims,
investor must refer the issue to the relevant Tax Authority); NAFTA supra note
162, art. 2103(6) (explaining competent authorities to assess whether the
measure is an expropriation); see also WAYS & MEANS COMM. DEMOCRATS, TPP
in Focus: Investment and Investor State Dispute Settlement – The Need for
Reform, (Mar. 20, 2015), https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/mediacenter/blog/tpp-focus-investment-and-investor-state-dispute-settlement-needreform; TPP, supra note 16, art. 29.4(8).
239. E.g., Park, supra note 232, at 233.
240. This would be contrary to some agreements that explicitly assert that
a mere application constitutes an investment and also preclude tribunals from
reading existing agreements broadly to include applications even when not
specifically included.
241. It would also be consistent with the Apotex decision finding that an
application for FDA approval of a drug is not an investment. Apotex Holdings,
Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 7.64 (Aug. 25,
2014).
242. E.g., Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 2.6(v),
2015, https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%
20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf
(stating
that “revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights” are
excluded as investments under the treaty if “consistent with the law of the Host
State”); see also Sean Flynn, TTIP Stakeholder Statement: Protect IP from
ISDS, INFOJUSTICE (Apr. 23, 2015), http://infojustice.org/archives/34319
(indicating that language—barring expropriation “by a court, administrative
tribunal, or other governmental intellectual property authority, limiting or
creating an intellectual property right, except where the decision amounts to a
denial of justice or an abuse of right”—was in Canada’s original proposal, but
omitted in the ultimate 2014 CETA version); Michael Geist, Did Canada Cave
on the Pharmaceutical Patent ISDS Issue in CETA?: Still No Text, but Official
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domestic law, rather than TRIPS consistency as the relevant
criteria would move towards ensuring that investment tribunals
have no jurisdiction to decide whether such application denials
were permissible under the TRIPS Agreement.
Narrowing the scope of investment disputes in existing
agreements to exclude IP is trickier. However, states can exclude
certain topics from ICSID dispute under Article 25(4) of ICSID.
Under this provision, an ICSID Convention State can notify
ICSID of a class of dispute that is not within the jurisdiction of
the Center “at any time” after approving the Convention.243 This
of course only governs disputes under ICSID, but considering the
broad membership of this group, that would still be relevant to
many countries who are signatories to the over 3000 bilateral
investment treaties. As of May 2016, there are indeed
notifications that eliminate consent for disputes relating to
expropriation and nationalization (China), claims arising from
armed conflicts (Guatemala), administrative decisions
(Indonesia), and investments relating to natural resources
(Jamaica).244 Accordingly, it would seem that intellectual
property rights could be a topic for which a similar notification
is possible.
2. Limiting Jurisdiction – Investment Definition
The scope of the definition of an investment outside of IP
can also be narrowed, particularly because some BITs have very
broad definitions of what constitutes an investment.245 In
particular, we endorse a definition of investment consistent with
the Salini decision, and propose that it be explicitly included in
future agreements. The Salini tribunal found that a qualifying
investment has four criteria: a certain period of performance and

Comments Suggests It Did, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www
.michaelgeist.ca/2014/08/canada-cave-pharmaceutical-patent-isds-issue-cetastill-text-report-suggests/ (quoting the same language and reporting the EU’s
response).
243. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, art. 25(4), Mar. 18, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 17
U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID].
244. Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the Purposes of
the Convention, ICSID/8-D (Sept. 27, 2016).
245. For an extensive review, see United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Scope and Definition: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements II, 7–9 (2011), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20102
_en.pdf.
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participation in the risks; contribution of the investment to the
economic development of the host state such as being beneficial
to the public interest or some transfer of know-how assessed in
a holistic manner.246 Although Salini is often cited, not all
tribunals consider themselves to be bound by it, or even require
all elements for an investment to exist; some explicitly reject the
need to for investments to meet all four factors in order to
establish jurisdiction.247 Future investment agreements could
require investor-state tribunals to find all these criteria as
prerequisites for their exercise of jurisdiction. The requirement
that the investment contributes to the economic development of
the host state is particularly useful in the context of IP rights.248
246. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 16, 2001). In addition, although
Salini was interpreting article 25(1) of ICSID, its interpretation has been
affirmed in non-ICSID cases. E.g., Romak S.A. v. Uzbekistan, Case No. AA280,
53 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009) (noting that even if an investor resorts to UNCITRAL,
Salini is relevant).
247. Philip Morris Brands Sárl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 204–10, 220 (July 2, 2013) (rejecting
economic development as an unnecessary element); Quiborax v. Bolivia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 225 (Sept. 27, 2012) (holding
that “a contribution to the economic development of the host State or an
operation made in order to develop an economic activity in the host State is not
an element of the objective definition of investment”); Bitwater Gauff Ltd. v.
United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 250 (July 24, 2008);
MCI Power Group v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, ¶ 165 (July
31, 2007); Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No.
ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment, II(B)(1) (Nov. 1, 2006);
Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA v. Algeria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/8, Award, ¶ 13(iv) (Jan. 10, 2005) (rejecting criteria of contribution to
investment to economic development). For the view that Salini is not supported
by ICSID’s negotiating history and doctrine, see J.D. Mortenson, The Meaning
of ‘Investment’: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment
Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257, 315 (2010).
248. E.g., Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5,
Award, ¶ 138 (Apr. 15, 2009) (additionally requiring bona fide nature of
investment to avoid abuses of corporate structure); Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v.
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶
53 (July 23, 2001) (accepting Salini test). Indeed, some tribunals have found
this element decisive. E.g., Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v.
Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 123–24 (May 17, 2007); Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo,
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the
Award, ¶ 33 (Nov. 1, 2006) (contribution to economic development considered
essential, although not sufficient). Other scholars agree with this approach.
E.g., Alex Grabowski, The Definition of Investment Under the ICSID
Convention: A Defense of Salini, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 287 (2014); Okediji, supra
note 144, at 1137. But see CHRISTOPHER H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID
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After all, simply obtaining a patent or trademark in a country
does not directly benefit a host country in the same way
investing in a physical plant would by the hiring of employees in
that country and other economic benefits that would come with
the physical location in the host country such as potential
technology transfers.
3. Limiting Abusive Investor Claims
Who is a qualifying investor can and also should be
narrowed in future investment agreements. One way to do so is
to prevent investors from bringing abusive claims as the tribunal
in Philip Morris v. Australia did by finding that the “principal,
if not sole, purpose of the [corporate restructuring] was to gain
protection under the Treaty.”249 Some recent agreements are
already seeking to limit corporate attempts to treaty shop for an
investment agreement. For example, CETA does not permit
claims by so-called “shell” or “mailbox” investors since its
definition of an “investor” requires that the entity own and
control investments that it has made in the country.250 In
addition, in an attempt to prevent reincorporation such as what
Philip Morris did before filing an investment claim against
Australia, CETA provides that investment claims are barred for
conduct that amounts to abuse of process.251 The importance of
this suggestion is underlined by the fact that investor-state
tribunals have not consistently rejected claims brought by
investors who had manipulated nationality requirements to
qualify as investors. 252
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 134 (2d ed. 2009); Antoine Martin, Definition of
“Investment”: Could a Persistent Objector to the Salini Tests be Found in ICSID
Arbitral Practice?, 11 GLOBAL JURIST 1 (2011).
249. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL,
PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 587 (Dec.
17, 2015); see also Eric De Brabandere, “Good Faith”, “Abuse of Process” and the
Initiation of Investment Treaty Claims, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1 (2012).
250. CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.1; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N,
INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN THE EU-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA)
(2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf;
Kevin Ackhurst et al., CETA, the Investment Canada Act and SOEs: A Brave
New World for Free Trade, 31 ICSID REV. 58, 62 (2016).
251. CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.18(3).
252. E.g., Lao Holdings N.V. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/12/6, ¶ 32 (2014) (finding the manipulation of the nationality
of the investor to gain jurisdiction at a time when the investor knew this would
adversely affect the investment constituted an abuse of process); Phoenix
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4. Exercising Comity in Multiple Proceedings Relating to
Similar Factual and Legal Issues253
In cases where a WTO treaty provision such as TRIPS is
involved, a state should argue that jurisdiction is precluded by
Article 23 of the DSU which grants the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement System exclusive competence to decide questions
relating to WTO treaties.254 Moreover, if there is a proceeding in
the WTO that raises similar legal and factual issues, such as
whether the TRIPS Agreement is violated, the state could
request that the tribunal stay the proceeding to avoid conflicting
determinations. Although it is unsettled whether international
tribunals have authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction that
they otherwise possess, there is some precedent for declining
jurisdiction based on comity.255 The logic of this is underscored
by the fact that recently concluded and pending agreements
include provisions that explicitly provide a precedent for staying
Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 70 (Apr. 15,
2009) (rejecting a claim because it had been brought following the transfer of
economic interests to a foreign company with a view to getting access to
investor-state arbitration under an existing mechanism). The 2016 Transglobal
Green decision is another recent case that could suggest a more rigorous
application of this rule. Diane Desierto, Arbitral Controls and Policing the Gates
to Investment Treaty Claims Against States in Transglobal Green Energy v.
Panama and Philip Morris v. Australia, EJIL: TALK! (June 22, 2016),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/arbitral-controls-and-policing-the-gates-to-investmenttreaty-claims-against-states-in-transglobal-green-energy-v-panama-and-philip
-morris-v-australia/; see also Transglobal Green Energy, LLC v. Republic of
Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/28, Award, ¶¶ 117–18 (2016) (finding intent
to “internationalize” a domestic dispute by creating “artificial international
jurisdiction”).
253. This question relating to disputes based on the same or similar legal
and factual disputes in multiple international dispute settlement venues has
received considerable attention. See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler et al.,
Consolidation of Proceedings in Investment Arbitration: How Can Multiple
Proceedings Arising From the Same or Related Situations Be Handled
Efficiently?, 21 ICSID REV. 59 (2006).
254. DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 23, Jan. 1, 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401.
255. E.g., Legality of the Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.),
Judgment, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. 279, ¶ 33 (Dec. 15, 2004) (suggesting
inherent power to decline jurisdiction to safeguard administration of justice as
underlying aim of any system of dispute settlement); Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition Among
International Economic Law Tribunals is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241
(2007–08).
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investor-state proceedings where there is a parallel related
proceeding.256 In addition, the TTIP has a provision that would
bar an investor from asserting another international claim
concerning the “same treatment” as that alleged in a pending
investor-state suit brought under the investment chapter in that
treaty.257
In addition, this approach is also consistent with the policy
behind the existence of investment agreements. Investor-state
tribunals are designed to protect investor rights created under
the investment treaty providing for the creation of such a
tribunal. States do not enter into investment treaties with a view
to authorizing investor-state tribunals to decide whether they
have violated obligations under other treaties. This
understanding that investor-state tribunal jurisdiction does not
extend beyond the subject matter of the Bilateral Investment
Treaty under which it is established should also preclude an
investment tribunal to import other treaty obligations into
investor-state proceedings through an MFN or umbrella
clause,258 not only because WTO obligations are outside the
scope of an investment treaty, but also because investors should
not be able to rely on WTO-created IP rights which are intended
to be enforceable only by States in the WTO.
B. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS
The impact of investment claims on TRIPS flexibility can
also be minimized if the scope of investment claims is limited.
The move towards more precision in investment agreements is
one way for States to better assert their sovereignty by providing
more guidance to arbitrators.259 For example, greater specificity
256. CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.24 (requiring that the Tribunal “shall” stay
proceedings if another international claim “could have a significant impact on
the resolution” of the investment claim).
257. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in Services,
Investment and E-Commerce, Investment Chapter proposal, EU, art. 14(2),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf
[hereinafter EU, TTIP proposal] (requiring declaration that there will be no
initiation of claims before domestic or international court concerning “the same
treatment as that alleged to be inconsistent” with investment chapter).
258. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (Nov. 13,
2000); Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n, on its Fifty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10,
¶¶ 76–77 (2001), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf (arriving
at the same point).
259. E.g., Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory Autonomy Through
Greater Precision in Investment Treaties: the TPP, CETA, and TTIP, 19 J. INT’L
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regarding the limits of traditional investment claims, with clear
language regarding inapplicability to certain IP issues, would be
valuable.
1. Towards Better Balance in Pending and Future
Agreements
There are a number of ways to limit the intrusion of
investment claims on domestic regulatory space under the
TRIPS Agreement which can be achieved by modifying the
language of certain clauses in pending and future agreements.
For example, countries can aim to categorically exclude such
claims through a non-precluded measure clause, or at least
minimize harm by more narrowly tailoring investment claims,
as well as introducing more balancing language in general.
2.

Non-Precluded Measure Clause

For pending and future agreements, a non-precluded
measure clause tailored to promoting the balance between IP
rights and other public policy is desirable. This suggestion builds
upon the fact that most agreements already have non-precluded
measure clauses that permit states to take actions that would
otherwise be inconsistent with the agreement in certain
exceptional situations, such as national security or public
emergency.260 Although traditional non-precluded measure
clauses are fairly narrow in focusing on issues of national
security and public health emergencies, they could be expanded
to more broadly address public policy. Some countries have
already done so. For example, the agreement between Hong
Kong and New Zealand provides that the agreement “shall not
in any way limit the right of either Contracting Party to take
measures directed to the protection of its essential interests, or
to the protection of public health.”261 Notably, this clause
eliminates some of the more restrictive requirements of
traditional clauses that require the action to be “necessary” for
the stated objective. It is also more expansive than some clauses
ECON. L. 27, 32 (2016); see also Prapanpong Khumon, Development of RuleBased Investment Protection Provisions in Mega-FTAs: A Manifestation or a
Negation from Customary International Law Principles? (Soc’y Int’l Econ. L.
Fifth Biennial Global Conf., Working Paper No. 2016/14, 2016).
260. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting
Ideology of the BITs, 11 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 159, 170–71 (1993).
261. Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the
Government of New Zealand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
H.K.-N.Z., art. 8(3), July 6, 1995.
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because it applies to the entire agreement, rather than only to
some specific claims. However, this clause is still not sufficiently
protective of TRIPS flexibilities because there would likely be a
dispute concerning whether some legitimate domestic actions to
promote public health to affordable medicine, such as through
TRIPS-consistent interpretations of patent law, constitute
protection of public health.
A clause that specifically states that the agreement
protecting investments does not limit the rights of parties to take
measures consistent with the TRIPS Agreement, including the
2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS Public Health and the 2014
Declaration on Patent Protection and Regulatory Sovereignty
Under TRIPS initiated by the Max Planck Institute (Max Planck
Declaration), would be better if possible.262 This should ideally
be in the investment chapter itself. Inclusion of such a clause
would help counteract the narrow views of many companies
concerning TRIPS flexibilities. The Max Plank Declaration,
signed by forty scholars from over twenty-five countries, is
consistent with the Doha Declaration, yet much more explicit
regarding what nations can do consistent with the TRIPS
Agreement.263 For example, although there are implicit
flexibilities under TRIPS that public health policy makers
recognize regarding defining the scope of a patentable invention,
as well as the scope of patent rights, such as its term, neither of
these are affirmatively stated in the Doha Declaration. Rather,
the only specific listed examples focus on compulsory licenses
and international exhaustion of patent rights. The Max Plank
Declaration, however, affirmatively lists all of these flexibilities.
Although these are TRIPS flexibilities, the lack of explicit
mention could still result in an investment tribunal failing to
consider the full range of TRIPS flexibilities—especially since
these decision makers are not expected to be familiar with IP
issues. The Max Planck Declaration is intended to clarify what
TRIPS provides, including its flexibilities. However, unless
specifically mentioned in an investment agreement, it would be
unlikely that this Declaration would be considered as having
much probative value for purposes of interpreting the TRIPS

262. Reto M. Hilty & Matthias Lamping, Declaration on Patent Protection:
Regulatory Sovereignty Under TRIPS (2014) (on file with the Max Planck
Society at https://www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf).
263. Id.
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Agreement by an investor-state dispute settlement tribunal.264
Of course, even if either or both were included, it is possible that
investment tribunals will only pay lip service to their existence.
After all, TRIPS flexibilities that are recognized by many
scholars and policy makers have not been widely embraced in
WTO Panel decisions.265 In addition, companies have repeatedly
challenged these flexibilities.266 Nonetheless, inclusion of the
language is far more preferable than traditional agreements
that only provide textual support for supporting investments.
a. Expropriation
Although indirect expropriations have long been
contemplated to have potential to improperly interfere with
264. The extent to which the flexibilities noted in Max Planck Declaration
are a core part of the TRIPS Agreement is likely a question of interpretation.
265. For example, in one case challenging Canada’s patent exceptions,
although Canada as well as many third parties suggested robust
interpretations of flexibilities in TRIPS articles 7 and 8, the WTO panel did not
fully embrace these interpretations and instead simply said that the articles
must be “borne in mind” without giving these provisions a thorough application.
Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R, (Mar. 17, 2000); see also CHRISTOPHER GARRISON, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (ICTSD) AND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), ISSUE PAPER NO. 17, EXCEPTIONS TO PATENT RIGHTS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2006); Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching
Towards Development in International Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 71, 101–02 (2007); Susy Frankel, WTO Application of “the Customary
Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46
VA. J. INT’L. L. 365, 385 (2005); Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines
Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
493, 496–501 (2000); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, A
Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual
Property Regime 196 (N.Y.U. Sch. L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 12-05, Mar. 2012) (concurring that the WTO panel in the
Canada case did not go far enough and suggesting how articles 7 and 8 can be
better utilized in the future).
266. TRIPS-consistent compulsory licenses are frequently improperly
suggested to violate TRIPS. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?
Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 101, 179 (2009). The use of TRIPS flexibilities to interpret
patentability standards as well as data exclusivity has also been contested. E.g.,
BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION, 2016 SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION
TO UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 41 (2016) (challenging the Indian
Patents Act § 3(d) as allegedly inconsistent with TRIPS), https://www.bio.org
/sites/default/files/files/2016%20BIO%20Submission.pdf;
PHARMACEUTICAL
RES. AND MANUFACTURERS OF AM., SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2016 TO UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 63 (2016) (alleging that Canada violates
TRIPS).
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legitimate domestic IP decisions such that many agreements
have an exception for indirect expropriation claims, the Eli Lilly
case illustrates that existing exceptions are inadequate. For
example, many investment treaty provisions only exempt from
indirect expropriation domestic action that cancels or revokes an
intellectual property right if consistent with the TRIPS
Agreement, and sometimes also with TRIPS-plus provisions.267
This means that the clause could permit an investment tribunal
to decide—perhaps inconsistently with WTO norms—whether
domestic action is consistent with TRIPS. In addition, even
recently concluded and pending agreements that aim to provide
greater regulatory discretion still provide inadequate protection
of TRIPS flexibilities since they do not seem to contemplate a
TRIPS conflict and would still permit investor-state tribunals to
find that legitimate public health regulations may constitute an
indirect expropriation.268
It would be preferable to bar expropriation claims for any IP
decisions if the domestic decision limiting, canceling, or revoking
IP rights is consistent with domestic law,269 or, alternatively,
only if the domestic action amounts to abuse of process, as India
has proposed.270 Alternatively, if countries are not willing to
agree to either of these proposals, they could at least
acknowledge that this is an issue, with a process for addressing
it in the near future; this is the approach taken with CETA.271
This step, however, is only valuable if there is a procedure for a
binding interpretation to minimize the difficulty of
amendments.272

267. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 162, art. 1110(7); TPP, supra note 16, art.
9.8(5); see also EU, TTIP proposal, supra note 257, art. 5(7); CETA, supra note
31, art. 8.12(6).
268. E.g., EU, TTIP proposal, supra note 257, annex I (Expropriation); TPP,
supra note 16, annex 9-B ¶ 3(b); see also TPP, supra note 16, annex 9-B ¶ 3(b)
n.37 (noting that pricing of and supply of reimbursement for drugs would be an
example, but nothing else relating to drugs, such as IP rights).
269. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 2.6(v),
2015, https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%
20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf.
270. India suggested this in its 2015 model BIT. See generally id.
271. CETA, supra note 31, annex 8-D (Joint Declaration Concerning Art.
8.12.6) (noting that parties “agree to review the relation between intellectual
property rights and investment disciplines within 3 years after entry into force
of the agreement or at the request of a party”).
272. E.g., id.
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Fair and Equitable Treatment

There are several possible ways to limit the extent to which
fair and equitable treatment claims could compromise domestic
flexibilities that give countries some discretion to determine the
appropriate scope of IP rights. In future agreements, such claims
could be entirely eliminated, or at least limited to state to state
action;273 alternatively the claims could be based solely on
“legitimate expectations.” Importantly, affirmatively stating
that legitimate expectations do not give rise to claims would be
an improvement. Thus far, no concluded or pending agreement
goes that far.274 Alternatively, future agreements could perhaps
recognize an exception predicated on alleged denial,
cancellation, or modification of IP rights similar to an exception
from indirect expropriation. Along similar lines, a clarification
that breach of another agreement, such as TRIPS, does not
constitute a breach would be an improvement over the recent
TPP language that acknowledges that a breach of a separate
international agreement is not necessarily a breach, yet seems
to still permit tribunals to come to this conclusion—and
essentially give companies like Philip Morris the ability to assert
such a claim for an alleged violation of TRIPS.275 Accordingly,

273. Although this is admittedly a radical proposal, India has suggested
this. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 4, 2015,
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%
20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf; LISE JOHNSON &
LISA SACHS, COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., POLICY PAPER 5, THE TPP’S
INVESTMENT CHAPTER: ENTRENCHING, RATHER THAN REFORMING, A FLAWED
SYSTEM (Nov. 2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/11/TPP-entrenchingflaws-21-Nov-FINAL.pdf (suggesting eliminating this entirely or leaving it only
subject to state-to-state resolution).
274. Recently concluded and pending agreements still leave the door open to
an FET claim based in part on breach of legitimate expectations. E.g., CETA,
supra note 31, art. 8.10(2)–(4) (on file with the European Commission) (cabining
FET claims to a closed list of violations, while still noting that tribunals “may
take into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor
to induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon
which the investor relied,” which could result in manifest arbitrariness or denial
of justice, as a type of FET claim); TPP, supra note 16, art. 9.6(4) (“[T]he mere
fact that a Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with
an investor’s expectations does not constitute a breach of this Article, even if
there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.”); E.U. Investment
Proposal for Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership art. 3(4),
Memorandum from E.U. to U.S. (Nov. 12, 2015) (on file with the European
Commission) (stating the same).
275. TPP, supra note 16, art. 9.3.

2017]

REGIME SHIFTING OF IP

493

another possible approach is to limit traditionally expansive fair
and equitable treatment claims to a closed list of possibilities,
such as denial of justice.276
Beyond limiting traditional investment claims, agreements
should also preclude overly expansive interpretations of other
provisions of investment claims. In particular, agreements
should preclude importation of substantive provisions from
other agreements through umbrella clauses. The 2016
investment chapter of CETA clarifies that although it recognized
most favored nation treatments, substantive obligations in other
agreements, including other international investment
agreements, are not obligations that can give rise to investment
claims.277 This is helpful, but further adding that none of these
provisions permit adjudication of claims under other
agreements, such as the TRIPS Agreement, is also necessary.
4.

Better Balance

Even though greater precision in defining key terms in
pending and future agreements is beneficial, that alone is
unlikely to be a complete solution. After all, even the recent
attempts to clarify the scope of expropriation and FET claims are
still subject to interpretation and application by arbitrators.
Given this, providing additional interpretative guidance outside
of specific investment claims may be beneficial to improve the
traditional lack of balance between investor rights and other
norms. Whereas traditional BITs often only included clauses
about investment, newer generation agreements are beginning
to introduce language regarding the right to regulate. Of course,
how competing norms are framed is critical in terms of whether
they are likely to promote a better balance. For example,
although Uruguay believed that its BIT had such protective

276. CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.10(2); see also NATHALIE BERNASCONIOSTERWALDER, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., COMMENTARY TO THE
DRAFT INVESTMENT CHAPTER ON THE CANADA-EU COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC
AND TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA) 17–20 (May 2013) (including Canada’s
proposed text for FET claims that provides a closed list of options such as denial
of justice, manifest arbitrariness and targeted discrimination as well as an
explanation for the distinction between this proposal and the EU’s broader
approach).
277. CETA supra note 31, art. 8.7(4).
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language,278 a tribunal found otherwise.279 Even in the recently
concluded TPP that the United States argues provides sufficient
discretion to governments to regulate through explicit
language,280 commentators have noted that the language is
unhelpful since it only permits states to regulate consistent with
the investment provisions.281 Improving the balance between
investor rights and other rights builds upon existing public
policy exceptions in many agreements that ensure domestic
rights to enact non-precluded measures in appropriately urgent
circumstances that would not result in an investment claim as
discussed above.
Parties could add public policy provisions in the preamble,
objectives, or even a separate declaration that might further
cabin the scope of expropriation and FET claims. For example,
the recently concluded agreement between Canada and the EU
explicitly notes, “[p]arties reaffirm their right to regulate within
their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as
the protection of public health.”282 Moreover, it clarifies that
modification of laws that may impact an investment do not
necessarily amount to a breach of an obligation.283 However,
affirming a right to regulate is not as strong as the TTIP
proposal that more explicitly states that the investment chapter
shall not affect the right to regulate measures that are necessary
for legitimate policy objectives, such as public health. Even this
stronger provision, however, would not immunize all domestic
actions since it is limited to measures that are “necessary,” and
278. Philip Morris Brands Sárl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 2013 ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 151–52, (July 2, 2013) (claiming
that BIT was not applicable because article 2(1) states that when parties
“recognize each other’s right not to allow economic activities for reasons
of . . . public health” the “only plausible meaning” is that public health measures
should be excluded, especially in light of the fact that public health is a right
recognized under the Constitution).
279. Id. ¶ 171 (July 2, 2013) (rejecting Uruguay’s claim that the BIT
excludes public health measures from the scope of the agreement).
280. E.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UPGRADING AND
IMPROVING
INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
FACT
SHEET,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading-and-Improving-InvestorState-Dispute-Settlement-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2017); see also
TPP, supra note 16, art. 9.15.
281. E.g., JOHNSON & SACHS, supra note 273.
282. CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.9(1); see also EU, TTIP proposal, supra note
257, art. 2.1 (“Provisions of this section shall not affect the right of the Parties
to regulate within their territories through measures necessary to achieve
legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health . . . ”).
283. CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.9(2).
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also to an arbitral decision on when action clearly relates to
public health. Regulation of tobacco products is clearly within
this. However, modified patent laws to improve access to low cost
medicine may not be seen to readily fall within this category.
How such a clause is interpreted, of course, may depend on
the composition of the tribunal, as well as on other clauses in the
treaty. Indeed, adding other textual bases for consideration of
public policy, including public health in the preamble of the
agreement and elsewhere as noted above, would also be helpful.
Although such clauses would provide interpretive context that a
tribunal could rely on, whether that happens will likely depend
on the composition of the tribunal. Accordingly, how states select
tribunalists is also important, as further discussed below.
C. TOWARD BETTER BALANCE IN EXISTING AGREEMENTS
A tribunal could also minimize the impact of a regime shift
with a thoughtful and balanced approach to treaty
interpretation that considers competing claims on both the
investors and respondent states side, as well as the broader
international legal and policy context in the particular case. Two
key approaches that tribunals can take in doing so are to
exercise more deference to government conduct, and to apply
rules that emphasize proportionality in evaluating competing
claims. Each of these will be discussed below.
1. Deference
One key strategy tribunals can take to minimize the harms
of the IP regime shift while simultaneously improving the
legitimacy of investor-state disputes would be to exercise great
deference to the actions of nations. After all, one major objection
to investor-state disputes is that they act as a supra-national
decision-maker, yet lack any democratic input.284 Since most
nations have checks and balances, including appeals after
negative judicial decisions, a panel of three individuals should
exercise caution before it second-guesses domestic decisions.
This seems particularly true where state action has an
underpinning in public interest and is undertaken in a nondiscriminatory manner. In such a case, where the exercise of a

284. E.g., Barnali Choudhury, Democratic Implications Arising from the
Intersection of Investment Arbitration and Human Rights, 46 ALTA. L. REV. 983
(2009). For another incisive analysis, see Sergio Puig, The Merging of
International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. (2015).
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sovereign prerogative cannot be attributed to motivations other
than the public interest at stake, an investor should bear a
higher burden of demonstrating that the burden imposed on its
intellectual property rights outweighs the public interest that
justified the challenged conduct.
In addition, tribunals should give sufficient weight, not only
to an investor’s claim, but the regulatory authority of a state in
a manner that acknowledges the balance between rights of IP
holders, but also how those rights should be balanced when they
intersect with policies such as public health. The first
investment tribunal to issue a public decision involving IP
provides a useful example. In Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the
Tribunal in part dismissed the expropriation claim on the basis
that Uruguay’s adoption of the challenged measure to protect
public health was “a valid exercise of the State’s police powers,
with the consequence of defeating the claim for expropriation.”285
The Tribunal invoked Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention
of the Law of Treaties to argue that the expropriation claim had
to be read against the customary international law norm that
“[p]rotecting public health has long since been recognized as an
essential manifestation of the State’s police power.”286 Thus, as
long as a bona fide measure to protect public health was nondiscriminatory and proportionate the Tribunal held it could not
constitute indirect expropriation.287 Similarly, in dismissing the
fair and equitable treatment claim, a majority of the Tribunal
held that “the responsibility for public health measures rests
with the government and investment tribunals should pay great
deference to governmental judgments of national needs in
matters such as the protection of public health.”288 However,
given universal agreement on the public health harms of
smoking that were the target of Uruguay’s regulation, the 2-1

285. Philip Morris Brands Sárl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 287 (July 8, 2016).
286. Id. ¶ 290–91.
287. See id. ¶ 305.
288. Id. ¶ 399. Notably, the Tribunal further held that
the present case concerns a legislative policy decision taken against
the background of a strong scientific consensus as to the lethal effects
of tobacco. Substantial deference is due in that regard to national
authorities’ decisions as to the measures which should be taken to
address an acknowledged and major public health problem. The fair
and equitable treatment standard is not a justiciable standard of
good government, and the tribunal is not a court of appeal.
Id. ¶ 418.
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decision supporting Uruguay’s right to protect public health is
not entirely surprising.
The Eli Lilly dispute provides a different example of how a
tribunal may exercise deference in a way that in effect promotes
TRIPS flexibilities without the tribunal having to determine the
applicability of a public health justification for a challenged
measure. Unlike the Uruguayan Tribunal which was confronted
with a series of tobacco regulations, the Eli Lilly tribunal focused
on judicial invalidation of patents. The Uruguayan tribunal
therefore had to explicitly address the health-based
justifications for the regulations in question in a way that the
Eli Lilly tribunal did not. Yet both tribunals were ultimately
deferential to the challenged decisions. In fact, in Eli Lilly, the
tribunal conferred considerable deference to Canada.289 This
finding is significant because, according to the tribunal,
Canada’s promise doctrine was justified by “legitimate policy
goals,” and that the tribunal did not have to “opine on whether
the promise doctrine is the only, or the best, means of achieving
these objectives.”290
2. Proportionality Analysis
Tribunals can also use proportionality analysis to balance
protection of foreign investments against non-investment
concerns in applying investment agreements that have no
inherent balance. Proportionality analysis is a method of legal
interpretation and decision making that should help mitigate
conflicts of different principles and legitimate public policy
objectives and has also been suggested as useful to enhance
legitimacy of that process.291 Applying proportionality analysis

289. According to the Tribunal, NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals are “not an
appellate tier in respect of the decisions of national judiciaries.” Eli Lilly,
Award, supra note 158, ¶ 221. The Tribunal also noted that considerable
deference would be given to decisions of national courts and only in cases of
egregious and shocking conduct would it be appropriate to “assess such conduct
against the obligations of the respondent State under NAFTA Article 1105(1).”
Id. ¶ 224.
290. Id. ¶ 423.
291. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephen Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance
Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest – the
Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW &
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 75 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); Alec Stone Sweet,
Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 47 (2010); Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy:
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does not result in an automatic win for either party, but should
ensure a more thoughtful balance of competing interests
through its multi-prong analysis of considering (a) whether the
state action serves a legitimate government purpose and is
generally suited to achieve this purpose (through some causal
relationship), (b) whether the state action is “necessary” in that
there is no less restrictive measure that is equally effective, and
(c), whether a balance exists between the effects of the measure
and the importance of the government purpose.292
Proportionality has arguably already been recognized as
reasonable for investment tribunals. Some tribunals have
applied such analysis already.293 Moreover, tribunals could
follow Harold Koh’s compelling argument in favor of taking into
account public health considerations, including the right to
health in investor-state arbitration.294
Proportionality analysis should cabin claims for indirect
expropriation as well as fair and equitable treatment. This
seems particularly important to FET claims since tribunals
sometimes rely too much on a breach of “legitimate expectations”
in finding a claim exists. Overly expansive interpretations can
be precluded with an appropriate balance between legitimate
expectations and a state’s right to regulate domestic matters. As
noted by one tribunal, “no investor may reasonably expect that
the circumstances prevailing at the time of the investment is
Exploring Proportionality Analysis in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L
DISP. SETTLEMENT 95 (2012).
292. E.g., Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 291, at 86–87 (outlining the
structure of the proportionality analysis).
293. E.g., Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, U.N.
Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], ¶ 297 (Mar. 17, 2006); MTD Equity
Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 113 (May
25, 2004). For example, whereas older decisions tended to find an indirect
expropriation based solely if the investor rights were harmed, more recent
decisions consider whether there is a legitimate state action that would obviate
an expropriation claim entirely – even if not explicitly stated in an investment
treaty. See Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 291, at 91–94 (discussing examples
where tribunals balanced state interests with the regulation’s effects on
investment).
294. Koh, supra note 154, at 433 n.4 (2016); see also REGIONAL WORKING
GROUPS OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION,
WHOSE RIGHTS ARE WE PROTECTING? ENSURING THE PRIMACY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS OVER INVESTOR PROTECTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
(Mar. 2016), http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/2016_03_Whose_rights
_are_we_protecting.pdf. In fact, the author argues that this should apply not
only to investor-state disputes, but also for WTO treaties.
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made remain totally unchanged,” in stating that any
“frustration” of investor expectations must be considered in
conjunction with the “host State’s legitimate right . . . to regulate
domestic matters in the public interest.”295 Other tribunals have
also considered the reasonableness of state actions and applied
proportionality.296
In fact, recently concluded and proposed agreements tend to
have more explicit terms that essentially direct tribunals to
recognize competing norms that can be buttressed by
proportionality analysis. For example, recent agreements have
language that addresses what constitutes legitimate
government purpose. Some contain a clause regarding indirect
expropriation that requires arbitrators to consider the impact of
government action, and its character, clearly noting that adverse
economic impact on an investment alone does not establish
indirect expropriation.297 Agreements also state “[e]xcept in rare
circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”298 Even
for arbitrators applying this language, thoughtful application of
295. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, U.N.
Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], ¶ 305 (Mar. 17, 2006); see also BG
Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, U.N. Commission on Int’l Trade L.
[UNCITRAL], Final Award, ¶ 298 (Dec. 24, 2007) (stating that there should not
be a “freezing of the legal system”).
296. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, R.G. 2005/14005/A, Partial Award,
¶ 232 et seq., (Aug. 19, 2005) (incorporating reasonableness into the fair and
equitable treatment standard); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, Award
in Respect of Costs, (Nov. 26 2002), http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/pope.aspx (scroll to
bottom of page and click “ARCHIVED – Final Award”) (considering the
reasonableness of administrative agency); see also Middle East Cement
Shipping & Handling v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6,
Award, ¶ 143 (Apr. 12, 2002) (requiring better notice than what was required
under domestic law given the consequences); Kingsbury & Schill, supra note
291. Notably, applying proportionality to non-precluded measures had very
different results in cases based on similar facts regarding Argentina’s
emergency measures to its economic crisis. See, e.g., Kingsbury & Schill, supra
note 291, at 98–102.
297. TPP, supra note 16, annex 9-B, para. 3(a)(i); EU, TTIP proposal, supra
note 257, annex I, para. 2(a).
298. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement, Oct. 31, 2005, T.I.A.S. 05-1031; cf. CETA, supra note 31, annex 83(A); TPP, supra note 16, annex 9-B(3)(b); EU, TTIP proposal, supra note 257,
annex I(3).
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a proportionality test is still necessary since this language does
not provide adequate guidance concerning what is a “rare
circumstance” or what method to use to balance the importance
of the government action against the economic impact on the
investment, or how to critically evaluate a stated government
justification for its actions.299
D. IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES
Alternatively, the overall process of resolving investment
disputes can be strengthened, that would improve outcomes for
disputes involving IP. This section primarily focuses on
improving the process for pending and future agreements. It also
includes recommendations that States should pursue under
existing agreements.
1.

Future Claims

A major change to the process could involve a permanent
and independent investment tribunal, as well as an appellate
tribunal in future investment treaties. These are not new
ideas.300 However, they are gaining increasing traction. This is
reflected in the recently concluded agreement between the EU
and Vietnam.301 In addition not only has the EU suggested these
measures in its negotiations with the United States for the TTIP,
but it managed to recently incorporate such provisions in the
investment chapter of CETA two years after the agreement had

299. Indeed, when the EU sought public consultation, many were considered
that this language still gave tribunals too much discretion to balance competing
values that are traditionally only within the sovereign of governments and
suggested that additional clarification is necessary on concepts such as what is
“manifest excessiveness.” Eur. Comm’n Working Document, supra note 229, at
18, 69–70.
300. E.g., INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVEST. DISP., POSSIBLE
IMPROVEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATION (2004)
(suggesting consideration of an appeals facility at ICSID).
301. E.U.-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, E.U.-Viet., Jan. 20, 2016,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437; see also Hannes
Lenk, An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and
Investment Agreements: A Discussion of the Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam
and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada, 1 EUR.
F. 665 (2016), http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/system/files/pdf_version/EP
_EF_2016_I_033_Hannes_Lenk.pdf (highlighting the new innovative court
system and the departure from the traditional arbitration-based system).
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already been concluded.302 Technically, the EU was simply
scrubbing the document, but it added substantial changes,
including a permanent investment tribunal, as well as an
appellate tribunal.303 There will be fifteen members of the
tribunal of first instance appointed by the CETA Joint
Committee for a renewable five year term,304 with the actual
three members of each tribunal appointed by the president on
some rotation system that although currently unspecified, is
different than the traditional approach in which each party
selects their own arbitrator.305 Perhaps most significantly, the
appellate tribunal has the power to review errors of law, as well
as manifest errors of fact, such that it can uphold, modify, or
reverse the tribunal’s award.306 Moreover, CETA contains a
commitment to work with other countries to create a
multilateral investment court,307 and other agreements may

302. E.g., CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.27–8.28; see also Press Release,
European Comm’n, CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on
Investment in Trade Agreement (Feb. 29, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib
/press/index.cfm?id=1468. This was noted as a savvy political move to try to
persuade the United States to agree to these proposals by incorporating them
in the agreement with United States’ trade neighbor. E.g., Stephen Drymer,
CETA Under New Management: Why is Trudeau Changing the Game?, CTR. FOR
INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (May 12, 2016), https://www.cigionline.org
/publications/ceta-under-new-management-why-trudeau-changing-game.
303. See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm’n, supra note 302 (noting that
the inclusion was agreed “in the context of the legal review”); see also Wolfgang
Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Legal Scrubbing or Renegotiation? A Textas-Data Analysis of How the EU Smuggled an Investment Court into its Trade
Agreement with Canada, THE PLOT (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.the-plot.org
/2016/03/24/legal-scrubbing-or-renegotiation/.
304. CETA supra note 31, art. 8.27.
305. Id. art. 8.27(7); see also August Reinisch & Lukas Stifter, CETA’s New
Take on ISDS: Toward an International Investment Court, CTR. FOR INT’L
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (June 22, 2016), https://www.cigionline.org
/publications/cetas-new-take-isds-toward-international-investment-court
(discussing the tribunal proposed under art. 8.27).
306. CETA supra note 31, art. 8.28(2).
307. Id. art. 8.29; see also Council of the European Union, Joint
Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) Between Canada and the European Union and Its member
States, Oct 27, 2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-135412016-INIT/en/pdf (agreeing to work “expeditiously toward the creation of a
Multilateral Investment Court”); Eur. Comm’n, the Multilateral Investment
Court Project, (Dec. 21, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press
/index.cfm?id=1608.
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allow for development of an appellate review even if one is not
currently in existence.308
Another improvement over the process under most
investment agreements would be to introduce greater control
over tribunal decisions. NAFTA introduced the Free Trade
Commission, with power to issue interpretive statements309
which it has used once to try to cabin overly broad FET claims;
in particular, the statement suggested that a breach of a
separate international agreement does not establish a FET
claim.310 Although that process has been controversial,311 it has
been somewhat helpful in reigning in overly broad FET
claims.312 Recently concluded and pending agreements can
include provisions that provide more control. For example,
CETA permits parties to adopt binding interpretations to
address possible errors of tribunals.313
The impact of an investment dispute can also be mitigated.
In particular, investment disputes are dangerous to domestic
sovereignty not just because of the chilling effect of expensive
litigation, but also because of non-monetary relief sought. For
example, Philip Morris aimed to nullify the tobacco regulations
308. E.g. TPP, supra note 16, art. 9.23.11 (“In the event that an appellate
mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investor-State dispute settlement
tribunals is developed in the future under other institutional arrangements, the
Parties shall consider whether awards . . . should be subject to that appellate
mechanism . . . .”).
309. NAFTA supra note 162, art. 1131(2) (providing that an interpretation
of the Free Trade Commission of a provision of the agreement “shall be binding”
on investment tribunals). This power is also contained in a few other U.S.
agreements before TPP. E.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 30(3), U.S.Rwanda, Feb, 19, 2008, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2008/101641.htm;
Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement, art. 10.22(3),
Aug. 5, 2004, 19 U.S.C. §§ 4001–11 (2012); Singapore Free Trade Agreement,
art. 15.22(2), Jan. 1, 2004, 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.501–.570 (2016).
310. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, North American Free Trade
Agreement: Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31,
2001), http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/NAFTA/Commission/CH11understanding
_e.asp.
311. Some have suggested that the interpretive statement by the FTC is
invalid. E.g., Charles H. Brower et al., Fair and Equitable Treatment Under
NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 9, 10 (2002) (“Tribunals
might conclude that [the statement] represent[ed] an ultra vires amendment
of . . . NAFTA.”).
312. E.g., Henckels, supra note 259, at 35 (noting that since the 2001
interpretation, tribunals have generally found the FET threshold to be high,
although some still find a violation).
313. CETA supra note 31, art. 8.31.3.
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in both Uruguay and Australia. If it had been successful, Philip
Morris would have been able to use an investment tribunal to
essentially overrule prior judicial decisions upholding the
tobacco regulations. Even though it was unsuccessful, that
possibility looms for future investment disputes unless an
agreement explicitly states otherwise. Recently concluded
agreements aim to address this. CETA, for example, clearly
states that Awards cannot lead to repeal of a measure, and that
companies may only obtain compensation for actual losses, and
not punitive fines.314 This is an important clarification because
although all NAFTA countries had previously made this
argument before NAFTA tribunals, it was not always
accepted.315 However, additional language may be desirable to
prevent a tribunal from enjoining government acts as an interim
measure, which is currently possible under existing
agreements.316 In addition, even if tribunals were precluded
from ever enjoining domestic actions, even on a temporary basis,
domestic laws might still be changed if a state settles a case and
agrees to such action.
Given the serious chilling effect from simply asserting an
investment claim, measures to reduce claims are necessary. One
way to minimize investment claims is to require the losing party
to pay costs.317 Currently, tribunals already have power to award
attorney fees and costs against investors that file frivolous
claims.318 However, tribunals are usually reluctant to use this
314. CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.39(1), 3–4; see also TPP, supra note 16, art.
9.29(4).
315. E.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, 125–60 (Sept. 19, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/ita0133_0.pdf (awarding damages to an investor
arising from its role as a producer within the United States, a power that
arguably fell outside the Tribunal’s mandate). For an explanation of how the
mistake in the Cargill outcome was clarified in the TPP text, see Sergio Puig,
Investor-State Tribunals and Constitutional Courts: The Mexican Sweeteners
Saga, 5 MEXICAN L. REV. 239 (2013); Sergio Puig, The Merging of International
Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (2015).
316. The EU has proposed language to bar tribunals from interim awards
that would essentially provide such relief. EU, TTIP proposal, supra note 257
(“Tribunal may not . . . prevent the application of the treatment alleged to
constitute a breach.”).
317. E.g., TPP, supra note 16, art. 9.29(3).
318. E.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
[ICSID], Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 61(2), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/partA-chap06.htm; United Nations Commission on
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authority and typically order each side to bear its own costs. It
is estimated the cost of an investor-state arbitration is over $4
million per case regardless of who wins or loses.319 Moreover,
even when tribunals shift fee payment, they seem more likely to
require losing states, rather than losing investors, to pay.320 Of
course, the Uruguay tribunal requirement that Philip Morris
reimburse Uruguay for part of its costs is notably different;
however, there was no similar award for Australia after it
prevailed in dismissing a parallel investment claim by Philip
Morris. How future tribunals will act is yet to be determined.
However, recently concluded or pending agreements seem to
recognize this phenomenon and explicitly include a provision
that the losing party shall pay costs.321
The process of adjudicating investment claims can also be
improved to promote results that are more balanced. For
example, greater transparency of proceedings, as well as broader
participation is needed. Recent guidelines from UNICTRAL
were a step forward, but requiring all documents be made
publicly accessible would be better.322 In addition, permitting
any interested party to participate would help to promote
competing norms. CETA permits a third party to provide a
submission and potentially attend a hearing, subject to the
Tribunal’s determination; however, there is no affirmative right
for interested third parties to participate as is common in
domestic proceedings, as well as the WTO.323 The EU has
proposed a better procedure for TTIP that would permit any
“person which can establish a direct and present interest to
intervene,” but only to support what is sought by one of the
International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Arbitration Rules art. 42 (2010),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arbrules-revised-2010-e.pdf.
319. E.g., Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 24, 2014) (alluding to the traditional
American “pay your own” way).
320. See generally id.
321. E.g., CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.39(5).
322. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
[UNCITRAL] Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration (2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ruleson-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf.
323. Compare CETA, supra note 31, art. 8.38(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 24, and
WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 4(11), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index
_e/dsu_02_e.htm#article4A and TRIPS, annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
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disputing parties, and only if the tribunal grants the application
after disputing parties have the opportunity to comment.324
2. Current Claims – Options for States Facing Investor-State
Arbitration
The investment cases thus far show that there are a number
of factors within the control of individual states that can have an
important impact on obtaining positive results within the
investor-state dispute resolution.
One critical issue for states to consider is tribunal
composition. As noted earlier, adjudications in the investor-state
dispute arena may depend substantially on who is selected as a
tribunal member. States likely are already aware of what
individuals tend to rule in favor of States, or at least, do not tend
to predominantly rule in favor of investors. In other words,
arbitrators that have previously indicated deference for
domestic government are ideal. However, given that IP issues
implicate the broader WTO/TRIPS framework as well as human
rights, choosing individuals who are knowledgeable about these
areas is also desirable; one commentator suggests that including
individuals with prior WTO experience can promote coherence
and cross-fertilization.325
In addition to the composition of the tribunal, States need
to take great care in pleading their case, including not only all
substantive, but also procedural issues like timely raising
jurisdictional issues. Notably, contrary to the views of some
public health advocates and even Australia’s position against
Philip Morris, Canada did not dispute the jurisdiction of an
investment tribunal to decide the case as only subject to stateto-state dispute under NAFTA, or subject to dispute by the
WTO.326 Of course, the cases are not identical since Australia
324. CETA, supra note 31, art. 23.
325. Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 829 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2840278. Of course, this point was made in the context of a
possible appellate system, but the broader point of coherence and crossfertilization would seem equally applicable to an investment tribunal.
326. Compare Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, U.N.
Commission on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], PCA Case No. 2012-12, Australia’s
Response to the Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 33–35 (2011) (arguing no jurisdiction
for alleged breaches of TRIPS for claims that have their own dispute settlement
mechanisms and objecting that permitting use of article 10 of the BIT would
establish a “roving jurisdiction that would enable a BIT tribunal to make a
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was addressing interpretation of an umbrella clause, whereas no
such clause applied in Canada’s case.
Extensively pleading all issues is essential in the investorstate disputes where third party participation is at best limited.
Not only is there no affirmative right for third parties to
participate, but even when they can participate, they may not be
permitted to raise issues not raised by the parties.327 Also, third
parties may not have access to all documents, which may
compromise their ability to fully address issues.328 Nonetheless,
to the extent that tribunals accept any third party participation,
states should seek the highest amount of disclosure and
transparency possible, as well as participation of third parties
through amicus briefs.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown how the protection and
enforcement of IP rights has shifted to international investment
law and investor-state arbitration. This shift is fundamental in
several significant respects. First, it creates a new set of
remedies available to holders of IP rights such as expropriation
and fair and equitable treatment. Since the shift to this forum is
in addition to the WTO/TRIPS forum, IP holders have the ability
to seek remedies against regulatory measures even when
consistent with WTO/TRIPS, and even if the IP holder cannot
persuade its own country to raise a WTO challenge.
International investment law presents investors an opportunity
broad series of determinations that would potentially conflict with the
determinations of the agreed dispute settlement bodies under the nominated
multilateral treaties.”), with Eli Lilly v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID
Case No. UNCT/14/2, Canada Counter Memorial, ¶ 209 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL
Arb. Trib. Jan. 27, 2015) (not seeking dismissal for lack of jurisdictions); see also
Flynn, supra note 237 (noting that Eli Lilly and Canada memorials assume that
article 110(7) permits the tribunal to decide whether Canada’s actions are
consistent with the IP chapter of NAFTA). Canada did mention that allegations
of the IP provisions of NAFTA should be bought on a state to state basis, but
made no allegation that investment claims tied to IP provisions of NAFTA were
outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Eli Lilly v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL,
ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Government of Canada Statement of Defence, ¶¶
83–84 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 30, 2014); see also Eli Lilly v. Gov’t
of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Canada Counter
Memorial, ¶¶ 209–10 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Jan. 27, 2015).
327. See sources cited supra notes 219–20, and accompanying text.
328. See sources cited supra note 18; see also Nigel Blackaby & Caroline
Richard, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration?,
in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 253, 271–72 (Michael
Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
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to challenge the balancing and flexibilities between the rights of
producers and users embedded in the WTO regime. This is a
major change from an earlier regime shift two decades ago when
developing countries utilized forums outside the WTO to provide
balance to the new minimum IP standards in TRIPS. However,
this earlier regime shift to promote greater flexibility is now
threatened by the shift to an investment regime. Investment
treaties and investment chapters in trade agreements do not
often contain the type of flexibilities contained in the TRIPS
Agreement, such as the preambular language of Articles 7 and
8, or the subsequent Doha Public Health Declaration that were
designed to promote interpretations that foster public health.
Further, whereas remedies at the WTO generally are
prospective modifications in the law or trade practice in
question, the international investment regime permits
companies to not only change the law, but to also obtain
significant financial compensation. This could have a major
chilling effect on legitimate domestic policy norms.
Two decades ago, developing countries began exploring
alternatives within and outside the WTO to re-balance the
minimum IP standards adopted by the TRIPS Agreement. In
forums such as the World Health Organization and the United
Nations, they sought a balance between IP rights and public
health. Investor-state suits challenging public health
regulations make it less likely that countries would readily
invoke TRIPS flexibilities because of the possibility of being
liable for hundreds of millions of dollars. Considering that even
developed countries like Canada have been more cautious in
adopting regulation in response to investor-state threats, there
is an especially serious threat to the use of TRIPS flexibilities to
promote public health for countries with few resources.
Our argument is that enforcing IP rights in investor-state
arbitration represents a new round of regime shifting—this time
initiated by private actors seeking to enforce their newfound
investment rights in investor-state arbitration. The goal of IP
holders is to undermine the flexibilities in the WTO TRIPS
regime through arbitral decisions that find violations of
investment provisions protecting their IP rights. In addition,
newer free trade agreements with investment chapters typically
have an IP chapter that has even stronger IP protections than
TRIPS. This enables a further intrusion onto TRIPS flexibilities.
The enhanced IP protections included in investment agreements
and investment chapters of free trade agreements are hard law.
By contrast, a lot of the flexibilities and balancing won by
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developing countries such as the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health in the WTO are soft law incapable of
enforcement in the same way that Philip Morris and Eli Lilly
pursued their claims in investor-state arbitration.
In the final part of this paper, we proposed some modest
strategies to counter regime shifting of IP enforcement to help
ensure the bona fide authority of governments to protect public
interest, especially public health. The first set of proposals
recommends defining and clarifying key terms to minimize harm
to domestic sovereignty and TRIPS flexibilities. The second of
our proposals recommends improving the investment dispute
process through a variety of reforms, including a popular current
suggestion to have an independent investment tribunal, as well
as an appellate tribunal. Some of these proposed reforms to the
process of investment disputes are already reflected in
negotiated and sometimes final texts, particularly of megaregional trade agreements. Although this is a new development
that currently does not address the vast majority of agreements
relating to investor-state arbitration, it does suggest a gathering
momentum to address a perennially criticized aspect of investorstate arbitration as problematic. Of course, even an independent
tribunal system with appeals would not necessarily fully address
the problems with the IP regime shift noted here; indeed, its
genesis relates to an explosion of investor-state claims and
inconsistent awards involving similar facts in general, but not
specific to IP. Nonetheless, the recognized need to reform the
investor-state system may suggest that there is some hope that
there is a trend towards recognizing a need to fine tune the
investment arbitration system. Hopefully this article has
adequately explained the dangers of the regime shift to investorstate arbitration such that it may promote further discussion
and proposals to robustly address the issues analyzed here.
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A: ANNEX ONE: CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL TOBACCO
REGULATIONS BY THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY

Country
Australia
Belgium

Plain
Packagin
g (PP)
Law
Yes
Planned by
2019

Bolivia

No

Brazil
Brunei
Canada

No
No
Proposed
in 1994

Other Tobacco
Regulation329
Labelling Law
NA

Health Warning
Regulations
Labelling Law
Labelling Law
Labelling Law
(The Tobacco Act
of 2000 imposes
restrictions on
promotion,
packaging, and
point-of-sale
restrictions. No
trademark
restriction)
Tobacco Products
Control Act
(TCPA)
mandating health
warnings, barring
ads, and

Domestic
Court
Challeng
e
Yes
NA

Yes
NA

No

No

No
No
TPCA
declared
unconstitu
tional in
1995 on
freedom of
speech
grounds.

No
No
NAFTA
investorstate suit
threatened
against
planned PP
Law

InvestorState
Challenge

Other
Challenges
WTO DSS
Big Tobacco
argues that
plain packaging
will encourage
black market.
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Extensive
lobbying
against 1994
proposal,
including
campaign
against Health
Minister and
threat of
NAFTA-based
arbitration.

329. Labelling Regulation includes laws, regulations, standards or
directives that: require tobacco products to have health warnings including the
kind of graphics and writings that can appear on them, restrict tobacco
advertising and promotion, provide for methods and procedures of tobacco
production, regulate additives in tobacco products, and provide for
measurement and testing of harmful substances in tobacco products.
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Cambodia
Chad
Chile
Costa
Rica

No
No
No
No

Ecuador
European
Union

No
Under
considerati
on

Finland
France
Hungary
India

No
Yes
No
No

Indonesia

Ireland

Kenya
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restricting
promotions
Labelling Law
Labelling Law
Labelling Law
Labelling Law
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No
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
No

No
No

No
No

No

Labelling Law
Labelling Law

No
Yes
No
Yes

No
No

No

Labelling Law

Yes

No

Yes, but
not
implement
ed
expected
effective
date 2017
No

Labelling Law

Yes

No

Labelling Law

Yes

No

Labelling Law
Directive
governing
labelling,
additives,
advertising,
notification and
tracking of
tobacco products
Labelling Law

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
ISDS threat
against planned
PP legislation
Unknown
Challenge in
the Court of
Justice of the
European
Communities

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Cigarette
companies
argued that
plain packaging
would
encourage black
market.
Delay in
implementation
by
manufacturers
Threats of legal
action in
national
Courts.

Bribery of
governmental
officials
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Korea
(South)
Lao PDR
Malaysia

No

Labelling Law

No

No

No
No

Labelling Law
Labelling
Regulations

No
Yes

No
No

Myanmar
Namibia

No
No

Labelling Orders
Labelling Law

No
No

No
No

Nepal

No

Labelling
Directive

No

No

New
Zealand

Proposed
passed
first
reading in
Parliamen
t in
February
2014

Labelling Law

No

No

Norway

Bill under
review

Labelling Law

No

No

511

Threat of ISDS
suit
Unknown
Tobacco
companies
warned
Malaysia was
violating its
international
trade
agreement on
passage of
labelling
regulations
Unknown
Threat of legal
action under
international
law on passage
of labelling law.
Tobacco
companies
working with
the U.S.
Chamber of
Commerce to
fight directive
because of
adverse impact
on U.S. foreign
investment in
Nepal
Threat of ISDS
suit. Evidence
that New
Zealand
proceeding
cautiously after
Philip Morris
case against
Australia
Unknown
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Philippin
es
Singapore
Slovenia

No

Labelling Law

Yes

No

Unknown

No
No

Labelling Law
Labelling Law

No
No

No
No

South
Africa

Plans to
introduce
it

Labeling Law

Yes

No

Sweden

No

Labelling Law

No

No

Thailand

No

Labelling Law

Yes

No

Togo

No

Attempted to
introduce
labelling law

No

No

Turkey
Ukraine

No
No

Labelling Law
Labelling Law

No
Yes

No
No

United
Kingdom

Yes

Labelling Law

Yes

No

Unknown
Lobbying on the
basis that
regulation
would
encourage black
market
Lobbying on the
basis that
regulation
would
encourage black
market
Lobbying on
basis that law
would be
tantamount to
illicit
censorship
Massive
lobbying effort
by tobacco
companies to
prevent
implementation
of law
Threat of ISDS
action by Philip
Morris stopped
enactment
Unknown
U.S. Chamber
of Commerce
influenced
Ukrainian
government
regulation of
labelling law
Tobacco
companies
lobbied against
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United
States

No

Labelling Law

Yes

No

Uruguay

No

Labelling Law

No

Yes

UAE
Yemen

No
No

Labelling Law
Labelling Law

No
No

No
No
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PP on the basis
that there was
no evidence
that legislation
would affect
smoking rates.
Philip Morris
threatened to
sue in British
Courts.
PP defeated in
courts on the
basis of
restriction of
freedom of
speech.
Lobbying
against it in
Congress.
Threats of high
cost ISDS
litigation
Unknown
Unknown
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B: ANNEX TWO: TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES: AN OVERVIEW

Type of
Flexibility
Transition Period
TRIPS art. 65-66
Patentability
terms
(TRIPS art. 27)

Pre-Grant
Opposition

International
Exhaustion
(TRIPS art 6)

Definition

Status

No need to provide patents on
drugs in country that did not
previously provide them until
2005
Although countries must grant
patents on “inventions” that are
“new,” have an “inventive step,”
and are “useful,” these terms
are undefined, permitting
countries to be more restrictive
about what is patentable.

Used by India, but not by most
other qualifying countries (barring
LDC that have a different
transition period)
India bars patents on drugs that
are similar to existing ones unless
they have improved efficacy
(limiting what is a new invention)
Proposed in Brazil and South
Africa since 2003 (industry
opposition)

Permits third parties to contest
whether patent should not be
granted. This might result in
limiting patent term since term
calculated from date of filing,
not issuance.
Permits countries to consider
patent rights “exhausted” by
first sale globally

India adopted, as has Brazil,
Indonesia, Thailand, and China

Compulsory
License
(art. 31)

Permitted, although most
flexible use is to have broad
grounds, such as patent owner
failure to make product locally,
or price affordably

Data protection
(art. 39)

Many believe countries can
grant generic drugs by
reference to data submitted by
originator given ambiguity in
TRIPS that does not expressly
preclude reliance.

Argentina Brazil, Bolivia,
Columbia, Ecuador, India,
Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Venezuela; Less than half of
African countries
Although a number of states have
laws, most do not use
India has broad grounds, but used
minimally and is reported to have
“promised” not to use after
pressure
India, Argentina, Armenia,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan & Ukraine
Recommended in Brazil and South
Africa, but strong opposition
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This speeds up process for
approving low-cost generics in
contrast to “data exclusivity”
that would bar this result.
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